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DEVELOPMENT  OF  EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
I.  GENERAL  PROBLEMS 
1.  Prince  Bernhard  of the  Netherlands  on  the  role  of the 
Europe  of  today 
In an  address which he  gave  in Brussels  on  22  April, 
Prince  Bernhard of the  Netherlands  spoke  of Europe's role 
in the  world  of  today. 
He  spoke  first of its political role,  emphasizing the 
links forged  between Europe  and  the United States,  both 
through  the  OECD,  which had  been  ttthe  basis of all the 
organizations now  working for  co-operation and  integra-
tion,"  and  through NATO  with the  European  Communit~es,  the 
United States had  sought  equal  partnership with Europe. 
Common  institutions had  been set up  and it had  gradually 
become  clear that  a  supra-national  executive  was  neces-
sary.  When  the Kennedy Round  was  mooted,  the  feeling had 
been that  the  two  major  post-war gains  - European inte-
gration and  the  presence  of the  USA  in Europe  - would 
give  the Western world  a  surer balance.  In the  meantime 
there  had  been serious  setbacks:  the  decision of the 
United Kingdom to  join in the  integration process had 
been thwarted  and  this had  called into  question the 
original  Schuman  concept.  The  principle  of co-operating 
with the  United States had  also  become  a  centre  of contro-
versy.  Polemics had  pervaded  the  whole  realm of co-oper-
ation,  "spoiling any  hope  of  a  political Europe,  which 
would  have  been  the  natural  follow-up  to  an  economic 
Europe." 
Europe  could  only play its part in the  world  of today in 
a  positive manner if it did  so  on  the  basis laid down  in 
1950.  At  present  the Europe  of the  Six was  still embry-
onic  and  would  not  attain to its full  stature until it 
opened its doors  to all countries  subscribing to its 
underlying principles.  The  natural place  for  such  a 
Europe  was  obviously in the  Atlantic Alliance. 
- 1  -It was  equally clear that this Europe  had  to  be  outward-
looking for its greatest responsibility in terms  of the 
world's  economy lay in promoting the  prosperity of the 
underdeveloped regions  of the world. 
Referring to European culture,  whose  wealth lay in its 
diversity,  he  said that  the  roots  of the  European genius 
lay in a  combination· of qualities that  added  up  to 
balance.  The  astonishing technical  progress  of the last 
half century had  jeopardized this balance.  In conclusion 
he  said that Europe  could  only  assume its rightful place 
in the world  as  a  civilizing· and  cultural agent if it 
learnt  "to  think ahead".  tLe  Soir,  23  April  1966) 
2.  The  President of the  Euratom Commission  speaks  of the 
future  of energy in Europe 
"The  Euratom experience is dTawing  to  a  close.  Rich in 
possibilities it has  been disappointing and  apparently 
sterile.  Yet  we  should not  throw  the  baby  out with the 
bath water."  This was  the  guarded verdict given by 
Mr.  Pierre Chatenet in an interview with  "Le  Figaro". 
"The  Treaty has  been plagued with bad luck,  he  said,  we 
had  the  illness of our first president  and  then cyclical 
reversals to  contend with.  The  Tr~aty speaks  only  of 
shortages;  today however  the  problem is the  excess 
availability of energy  and  immediately usable  uranium." 
What  was  to  become  of Euratom when  the  merger  went 
through?  "Vested with a  general responsibility,  the  new 
European Community  will  have  to  take  over the  real  tasks 
of Euratom.  The  four research centres,  especially Ispra 
have  carried out valuable  research and  experiments which 
have  been of increasing interest  to industry.  In the 
years  ahead,  we  shall have  to  equip ourselves with very 
many  and very  costly nuclear generating stations." 
Mr.  Chatenet  then  spoke  of a  field close  to his heart,  to 
wit,  industry:  "There  are  at present,  apart  from  the  atom, 
three  sensitive  areas:  space  research,  aerodynamics  and 
elec~ronic computers.  If Europe  is to  succeed it must  do 
so in these  four  spheres  or fall by  the wayside.  This 
brings us rather wryly back  to what  Robert  Schuman  said: 
We  must  bring the  industries together to  oblige  the 
Community  to  become  united." 
- 2  -"We  must  end  the  brain drain,  he  went  on,  and  give 
contracts  to  those  who  spend  a  few  years in the  USA 
which  oblige  them to return.  The  Germans  have  been 
successful in coupling teaching charges with industrial 
research." 
"Lastly we  must  choose  for Brussels men  of the  stature 
of the  pioneers whom  France  sent  to Luxembourg.  The  best 
way  for France  to  play  a  part in Europe is to  make  this 
the  responsibility of men  of real  calibre."  ( "Le  Figarq", 
28  April  1966) 
3.  Europe  a  talking point in the  Belgo-Italian meetings 
On  his  three  day  State visit to Italy  (29-31  March),  King 
Baudouin of the  Belgians was  accompanied  by Mr.  Harmel, 
Foreign Minister;  he  had  talks with Mr.  Saragat,  Presi-
dent  of the  Italian Republic,  Mr.  Moro,  President  of the 
Council,  and  Mr.  Fanfani,  Foreign Minister.  A  joint 
communique  was  released at  the  close  of the  State visit 
expressing the  satisfaction felt  on both sides at  ~he 
wide  measure  of  agreement  reached in the  meetings  on 
international  problems  and  the  need  to maintain the 
Atlantic Alliance,  the  guarantee  of peace,  freedom  and 
security  and  on  the  need for  an  agreement  on  the  non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Particular attention 
was  paid  to  European problems;  in discussing these  both 
Heads  of State  confirmed  the  faith of their countries in 
the  future  of the  European Communities  and in the  chances 
of achieving - while  respecting the  special  characteris-
tics of the  individual  countries  - the later stages which 
should lead  out  into  a  united,  democratic,  outward-look-
ing Europe,  which would  underpin  the  progress  of all 
countries.  · 
The  President  of the  Italian.Republic  and  the King  of  the 
Belgians  explained their views  on European i·ssues in 
replying to  toasts at  an  official dinner  on  29  March. 
Mr.· Saragat  stressed the  friendship  between Belgium and 
Italy which had  developed into  an  alliance  and  a  commu-
nity of purpose.  The  most  convincing mru1ifestation of 
this community  of purpose  was  the  spirit in which the 
two  countries were  pursuing  the ideal  of European unifi-
cation.  He  added  that  a  democratic,  outward-looking 
Europe,  a  bulwark  of  the  free  world,  economically  and 
politically united that respected  the  identity and 
individual  characteristics of  the  Member  States was  the 
- 3  -underlying motive  force  of Italy's policy.  Her  objective 
was  a  Europe  constructed  along  these lines,  a  Europe 
peaceful  and  strong,  a  mainspring  of social  progress in 
its respect for  the  freedom  and  dignity of man. 
King Baudouin said in reply:  "United by  a  number  of 
agreements,  including the  European  and  Atlantic Alliances, 
our  two  countries have  brought  to  them  a  spirit of loyal 
co-operation and  we  have  found  a  close  approximation of 
our opinions.  In unitin~ Europe,  a  sphere  where  the  name 
of Alcide  de  Gasperi  has\become  a  by-word,  our identity 
of aims will help in the  search for  that balance  which is 
at  once  difficult to  strike  and  essential  to  our  common 
future.  We  Belgians  are  happy  at what  has been  achieved 
in this sphere  and  at  the  growing volume  of trade  between 
our countries which bears  out  the  relevance  of our  joint 
efforts.  Today  we  should like to  express  our fervent  -
and  may  we  add  confident  - hope  that further progress 
will  soon be  made  and  that this progress will  enable  us 
to build up  on  a  lasting basis this economic  Community 
that was  born in this very city nine  years  ago." 
(Corriere  della Sera,  30,  31  March~  1  April  1966;  Rela-
zioni Internazionali,  9  April  1966) 
4.  The  European policy of the  "Centre  Democrate" 
The  democratic  convention which was  held in Lyon  on  22 
and  23  April  adopted  a  "Centre  Democrate"  charter.  After 
hearing  a  report given by Mr.  P.E.  Gilbert,  former  French 
Ambassador  to Israel,  who  stressed the  need  for  a  supra-
national Europe,  endowed  with Community  institutions,  the 
Convention adopted  the  foreign policy section of the 
Charter. 
For  the  "Centre  Democrate"  a  "united Europe  is not  only  a 
need  but  a  common  resolve.  France  alone  cannot  weigh  on 
great decisions,  avoid  or resolve  conflicts,  help  and. 
organize  the  third world,  uphold  the  originality of her 
own  civilization.  This  would  predicate  an  economy,  a 
budget  and  an  army  on  a  continental  scale. 
A united Europe is thus necessary.  It will  be  the diffi-
cult work  of  a  generation.  It needs not  a  spirit of 
calculation but  one  of boldness,  not  egotism but genero-
sity,  not  pride  but lucidity,  not  denigration but 
enthusiasm." 
- 4  -For  the  "Centre  Democrats":  "It is the  Europe  of  the 
peoples  that  we  have  to  create,  transcending nationalism 
to  create  the  United States of Europe.  Europe  needs  a 
responsible leadership,  able  to  impose  the  necessary 
discipline.  It therefore  needs  strong,  democratic,  Com-
munity institutions to  make  it independent  of  any  exter-
nal  hegemony,  ready  to  engage  in a  dialogue  with  any 
country regardless of its political  system. 
How  can institutions be  created that  are  untainted by  the 
tints of the  old  antagonism between nations?  By  creating 
a  European Parliament  endowed  with real  powers  comprising 
two  assemblies:  one  representing the  States  and  the  other 
elected by direct universal  suffrage  - strengthening the 
Community  bodies which  foreshadow  the  European Executive-
by giving the  Court  of Justice of the  European Communities 
the  powers  of  a  supreme  court." 
"Europe  should be  amenable  to  a  world  organization cast 
in planetary  terms.  A united Europe  alone will  be  able 
to negotiate  the  difficult phases in the  re-unification 
of Germany.  It will have  to  find  a  realistic formula 
which will  allow of the  United Kingdom's  inclusion in the 
organization without  prejudice  to  the  Community  T~eaties. 
At  the  same  time it will  open its doors  to  any  state 
willing democratically  to  accept its institutions.  When 
Europe  is united,  prosperous  and  strong it will, in an 
association of partnership with  the  United States,  be 
able  to  meet its commitments  and  take  part in the  manage-
ment  of the  world's affairs." 
Europe  must  work within the  United Nations'  framework  and 
take  as its aim  "a form  of peaceful  coexistence  that is 
not merely  a  balance  of terror." 
Europe  is under  an  obligation to help  the  third world. 
"The  situation in the  third world would  justify action on 
a  European  scale.  Multilateral  assistance  ought  to  be 
given preference  over bilateral help,  whether this 
involves capital  aid,  providing technical  experts for 
agricultural  training,  or other forms  of co-operat:i,.on." 
"The  most  effective  solution to  France's security problem 
is a  united Europe.  The  national  strike force  is too 
heavy  a  burden,  as  a  deterrent it lacks credibility.  To 
begin with,  Europe's nuclear problem could be  solved 
through an  agreement  between France  and  the  United King-
dom.  The  Atlantic Alliance  could  be  refashioned  through 
a  "wider-Europe"  formula.  When  the  NATO  Treaty is 
revised in 1969, it should give  Europe  real responsibility 
in the  organization and in the  joint defence  task  and 
- 5  -Europe  should be  associated in planning  and  putting into 
effect nuclear strategy to  preclude  the  proliferation of 
nuclear  arms. 
Power  springs  from unity as  independence  springs  from 
power.  What  the  "Centre  Democrate"  wants is a  Europe 
that is politically united,  economically  strong  and 
diplomatically independent in the  service  of peace." 
(Charter of  the  "Centre Democrate") 
5.  Views  of the  UEDC  on European  questions  and  the  NATO 
problem 
When  the  Executive  of the  European Union of Christian 
Democrats  (UEDC)  met in Brussels  on  5  April,  the  focal 
points were  European questions  and  the  NATO  problem.  The 
meeting was  presided over  by-Mr.  Mariano  Rumor,  Secretary-
General  of the  Union  and  those  taking part included 
delegates  from Christian Democrat  parties from  the  Six 
EEC  States,  Switzerland,  Austria and  San Marino. 
In his  opening address,  Mr.  Rumor  stressed the  construc-
tive  developments  that had  followed  the  Taormina Confer-
ence  (of December  1965)  both in terms  of the  activity of 
the Christian Democrat  Party  and  o.f  the  pan-European 
movement.  These  constructive  developments  had  been the 
resumption of the  activity of the  Community  following 
the  Luxembourg  Conference;  the  election of Mr.  Alain Poher, 
the  French Christian Democrat  Senator,  as President  of the 
European Parliament;  the  success  of the  Christian Democrat 
Party in the  recent  general  election in Austria.  Mr.  Rumor 
then referred to  the  NATO  crisis,  pointing out  that  the 
Christian Democrat  parties were  agreed  on  the  desirability 
of re-appraising the  NATO  structure in 1969  when  that 
Treaty expired,  provided  always  that  the  principles under-
lying the  military integration of  the  member  nations were 
safeguarded. 
Mr.  Rumor  then went  on to  deal  with European problems.  He 
said there  was  a  certain similarity between the various 
for~s of  economic  integration and  these  had  to  be  seen in 
an overall  perspective.  He  observed  that  the  connexion 
between the  problems  of the  common  agricultural  policy  and 
the Kennedy  Round  of tariff negotiations in Geneva  had  to 
be  recognized.  He  stressed the  need  to  tackle  the  prob-
lem of merging the  three  European Communities  at  an early 
date.  He  felt it would  also  be  desirable  to  step up  the 
- 6  -progress of Community  policy  on behalf of the  developing 
countries,  especially those in Latin America. 
At  the  close  of the  discussion on  the  report  by Mr.  Rumor, 
a  communique  was  released in which the  resumption of the 
Community  undertaking was  emphasized.  The  communique  went 
on:  "The  significant points  of this resumption must  remain 
1.  the  political integration objective; 
2.  the will  to  state  economic  policy problems in terms  of 
the  Community  perspective  and  to find  a  collective 
solution to  the  problems  involved in the tariff nego-
tiations; 
3.  to  draw up  a  European policy for  the  developing coun-
tries,  especially  those in Latin America; 
4.  to  stand fast  by  the  Atlantic  design which  a  European 
policy  will help  to  strengthen and  adjust  to  new  NATO 
developments. 
(Il Popolo,  6  April  1966;  La  Stampa,  6  April  1966). 
- 7  -II.  ECONOMIC  POLICY  AND  ECONOMIC  SECTORS 
1.  The  CGIL  and  the  CGT  address  a  memorandum  to  the  EEC 
In November  1965  the Italian and  French left-wing trade 
union organizations  (Confederazione  Generale  Italiana del 
Lavoro  and  the  Confederation generale  du  Travail)  set up 
a  standing committee  to  act  as  a  ginger group  and  co-or-
dinating body  to  be  responsible  for  trade union action in 
Western Europe.  (See  "European Documentation",  1966,  No.1, 
page  21).  On  April  5,  the  committee  in question addressed 
a  memorandum  to  the  EEC  and  Euratom Commissions  and  to 
the  Council  of Ministers  of the  Community.  This was 
generally relE!ased  at  a  recent  press conference  in Brus-
sels by  the  respective  secretaries-general  of  the  two 
trade union organizations,  Mr.  Novella  and  Mr.  Frachon. 
The  memorandum  outlined the  views  of the  CGT  and  CGIL  on 
the  economic  and  social  situation in the  Community,  its 
implications for  the  worker  and his right  to  be  represent-
ed  on  the  Community  bodies.  The  main feature  of the 
economic,  social  and political situation,  the  memorandum 
read,  was  increased  power  of the  monopolies  to  manipulate 
the  economic  policy of the Member  States.  This  power 
enabled  the  capitalists to reject  the  claims  of the  work-
ers  on  the  pretext that prices had  to  remain  competitive. 
In the  world  of the  EEC-worker,  the  social  objectives of 
the  Treaty  of .Rome  (set forth in the  Preamble  and 
Articles  2,  3,  39,  48  and  117  to  120)  had not  been 
attained with  respect  to  a  whole  series of points.  This 
view was  share'i  by  some  of the  national  trade unions in 
the  EEC  and  by  the  CISL  and  CISC  international bodies. 
The  two  trade  union organizations were  aware  that  prob-
lems  concerning working conditions had  to  be  resolved at 
the  national level;  since  there  was  a  European Economic 
Community,  however,  this  ought  to  take  into practical 
.  account  the  interests of the  worker  and  respect  the  aims 
1  embodied in the  Treaty of Rome,  especially that  of 
harmonizing soeial legislation at  the  most  favourable 
level. 
In the  second part of its memorandum  the  committee  attack-
ed  the  discrimination against  CGIL  and  CGT  workers  on  the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee,  the  committee  of  the 
European Social  Fund,  the  committee  for  the  free  movement 
of workers,  the  consultative  committee  on  occupational 
training and it claimed  the  right  of the  two  organizations 
- 9  -to  be  represented  on  these various bodies.  "Such dis-
crimination,"  the  memorandum  read,  "is not  only incon-
sistent with the legitimate rights of  the  CGIL  and  the 
CGT  to  assume  their rightful  place in the  institutions of 
the  Common  Market, it is also  prejudicial  to  the  interests 
of  the  worker in France,  Italy and  the  other EEC  States 
in that it vitiates the  overall  representation of the 
working  man.  Such  discrimination also  hampers  agreement 
and  understanding between  the  various unions in their 
efforts to  improve  the  social  policy of the  Community. 
The  CGT  and  the  CGIL  therefore  demand  their right  to  be 
represented  on  the  Community  bodies  so  that  they  may  work 
there  to  defend  the interests of  the  workers.  They 
recently  approached  their various  governments  to  demand 
full representation in the  next  delegation of workers  to 
the  European institutions.  The  Committee  asks  the 
Community's  Council  of Ministers  and  the  EEC  and  Euratom 
Commissions  to  do  all within their respective  powers  to 
meet  these wishes  to which  the  Treaty makes  express 
reference.  The  Committee is determined  to  continue its 
struggle  to  obtain full recognition of  the  rights that 
should  accrue  to  the  CGL  and  the  CGIL  by virtue  of their 
role  and  authority  among  the  working classes of France 
and Italy and  their determination to  defend  the  interests 
of the  French and Italian workers within  the  institutions 
of  the  Common  Market." 
The  EEC  Council  of Ministers  answered  this memorandum  on 
13  April  1966,  in these  terms:  "Under  the  Treaty  of Rome 
it is for individual  governments  to  submit  to  the  EEC 
Council  the  names  of candidates  for  the  posts assigned  to 
each country  on  the  Economic  and  Social Committee."  Fol-
lowing this reply,  the  CGIL  Secretariat sent  a  letter 
dated  16  April  1966  to Mr.  Moro,  President  of the  Council 
in which it reaffirmed  the  position it had  adopted in the 
memorandum  of  5  April  and in a  previous letter addressed 
to Mr.  Moro  on  15  January  1966  (See  "European Documenta-
tion",  1966,  No.  1).It also  informed Mr.  Moro  of the  reply 
it had  received from the  EEC  Council  and  drew  attention to 
the  absence  of any  opposition on the  part of  that  body  to 
changes in the  Italian trade  union delegations  to  the 
Community  bodies.  It confirmed  that it was  for individual 
government~? .to  submit  to  the  Cou!!cils  the  names  of 
candidates for posts reserved for  each country  on  the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee.  It stressed  the  phrase  in 
Article  195  of  the  Treaty of Rome  "···  to  ensure  adequate 
representation of the  various  categories  of economic  and 
social  activity" which precluded  any  category being re-
presented only partially.  The  letter stressed that  the 
exclusion of representatives of  the  CGIL,  which was  in 
point  of fact  the  most  representative  of  the  Italian trade 
- 10  -union organizations,  was  in conflict with Article  195  and 
constituted an unjustifiable discrimination.  The  CGIL 
Secretariat therefore  asked  that CGIL  representatives be 
among  the  candidates for  the  Economic  and  Social  Commit-
tee in order to  guarantee  a  fair  (and  proportionate)  re-
presentation of all the  national  trade.union organiza-
tions. 
The  CGIL  and  CGT  memorandum  met  with strong opposition 
from  the  CISL  (Confederazione  Italiana Sindacati Lavora-
tori).  On  6  April  1966  the  CISL  addressed  a  letter to 
Mr.  Moro,  President  of the  Council,  to Mr.  Fanfani, 
Foreign Minister,  and  to Mr.  Bosco,  Minister of Labour, 
in which it informed  them of the  resolution passed 
unanimously  by  the  European Executive  of  the  CISL  inter-
national with reference  to  the  CGIL  request  to  be  repre-
sented on  the  EEC  Economic  and  Social  Committee  when its 
membership  was  renewed. 
In the  motion,  the  Executive  confirmed  the  resolution 
passed  by  the  Annual  General Meeting of  the  CISL  Inter-
national  trade  unions in the  EEC  countries,  held in Paris 
in 1964,  in which it rejected  "any  contact with  any 
organization,  affiliated to  the  world· trade union federa-
tion,  and  hence  Communist"  and  opposed  CGIL  and  CGT 
members'  inclusion on  the institutional bodies  of the  EEC, 
and,  hence,  on  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee. 
The  CGIL  Executive,  in its agenda of 7  April  1966,  remind-
ed  the  CISL  and  the  UIL  (Unione  Italiana dei Lavoratori) 
that  "the  participation of the  CGIL  in the  work  of the 
community  consultative  committees would help  to  promote 
trade union discussion on  the  general  points  of interest 
affecting social progress  and  economic  planning  and  that 
it was  the  general  conviction that action should  be  taken 
as  soon as  possible  the  better to meet  the  demands  of the 
Italian workers in their present relations with the  nation 
at large  and in their rapid progress  towards  an ever-
increasing degree  of internationalization."  (Agence 
Europe,  Documents,  6  April  1966,  L'Unita,  6,  8,  14,  17 
April  1966;  Il Popolo,  7  April  1966;  Avanti,  17  April 
1966) 
2.  The  problems  ar1s1ng from  the  strike of female  workers 
at  the  national  arms  factory in Herstal,· Belgium 
At  the  beginning of February,  female  workers  at  the 
national  arms  factory in Herstal,  representing one-third 
of  the  factory's  total labour force,  walked  out in support-
- 11  -of a  demand  that Article  119  of the  Treaty of Rome  (which 
requires that  there  shall  be  equal  pay for men  and  women) 
be  given effect in their case  as  from  1  January  1965. 
This particularly long strike  and  the  number  of messages 
of support  the  strikers had  received,  led to  a  debate  on 
this problem in the  Belgian Chamber  of Representatives  on 
5  April. 
The  debate  stemmed  from  questions put  to  the Minister for 
Labour  and  Employment  by Mr.  Timmermans  and Mrs.  Copee-
Gerbinet;  these  set the  problem in its Community  context. 
Mr.  Timmermans  began by  reviewing the  progress made  to-
wards  "equal  pay  for equal  work".  In 1952,  Belgium had 
ratified Convention No.  100  (adopted in June  1951  by  the 
International Labour Organization)  on equal  pay for men 
and  women  doing  ~he  same  work.  In 1958  Belgium signed 
the  Treaty  of Rome,  Article  119  of which endorsed this 
principle.  In  1960  the  EEC  Commission recommended  to  the 
Member  States that they  accelerate its implementation. 
Finally,  in 1961, the  Council  of Ministers laid down  a 
definite  time-table whereby  equal  pay  was  to  become 
effective  as  from  1 ·January  1965.  He  noted  that the  pay 
disparity had  been reduced but  none  of  the  bills tabled 
to  give  effect  to Article  119  had  been made  law. 
Mrs.  Copee-Gerbinet  said:  "The  failure  to  apply  this 
Article puts  our  country  to  shame  especially since  we 
profess  to. be  in the  vanguard  of civilization and  progres~ 
Herstal is neither a  local nor  a  national matter.  It is 
a  European issue.  The  giant organizations that settle 
here  must  realize  that  they  should  pay greater attention 
to  the  concept  of human  dignity." 
Subsequent  speakers rejected  the  arguments  that had  been 
put  forward  in favour  of delaying pay  equalization;  these 
included Mr.  Magnee,  Mrs.  Groesser-Schroyens,  Mrs. 
Verlacht-Gevaert  and Mr.  Perin.  The  arguments  included 
female  competition for men's  jobs,  absenteeism on the 
part of  female  workers.  "If engaging women  is so  dis-
advantageous,  why  do  firms  take  them  on?  Their motives 
are  surely not  philanthropic,"  said Mrs.  Groesser-
Schroyens. 
Mr.  Servais, Minister for Labour  and  Employment  said in 
reply:  "The  principle of equal  pay has for  a  long time 
been  among  the  social  aims  of  every government.  In view, 
however,  of the  serious disparities that still exist, it 
will only  be  possible  to  implement Article  119  of the 
Treaty of Rome  gradually,  to  allow for  the  necessary 
adjustments  to  be  made.  Belgium's  economic  situation 
- 12  -I 
allows  for  only  a  moderate  wages  policy, if a  price-wage 
spiral is to  be  avoided."  Wages,  he  added,  were  a  matter 
for the  social partners.  The  Government  could  do  no  more 
than to  pronounce  the  collective wage  agreements  non-
binding in the  event  of their clashing with Article  119 
of the Rome  Treaty. 
At  the  close  of the  debate,  Mr.  Larock tabled  a  motion in 
which  the  Chamber  "felt that all the  necessary measures 
to  ensure  that international  conventions were  adhered  to 
should  be  taken."  This was  passed  on  the  following  day  by 
109  votes  to  69. 
A bill qalling for equal  pay was  tabled in the  Chamber  of 
Representatives.  (Chamber  of Representatives,  Proceedi~, 
sessions of 5  and  6  April  1966) 
3.  The  French Cotton Industry Union  opposed  to bringing 
forward  the  1970  Rome  Treaty completion date 
At  a  press  conference  given by  the  French Cotton Industry 
Union,  Mr.  Guy  de  Frondeville,  Delegate-General,  said 
that cotton had  been particularly badly hit by  the  crisis 
the  textile industry went  through in-1964-65;  cost prices 
had risen by  5-8%,  the  financial  re.sults  had  been dis-
astrous,  and  twenty-eight  firms  and  forty-seven factories 
had  had  to  close  down. 
Mr.  de  Frondeville  stressed that  the  job  of improving 
cotton's competitiveness had  been set back  by. a  year as  a 
result of the  cut-back in profit margins;  the profitabili-
ty of cotton firms  was,  at present,  the  industry's over-
riding concern.  It had  to  obtain better selling prices. 
It had initiated talks with the Minister for  the  Economy 
with a  view  to  concluding with him  a  stability contract 
and  a  programme  contract. 
~  He  outlined the  support  the  cotton industry hoped  to 
obtain from  the  public  authorities  (especially are-
appraisal  of balance  sheets).  He  argued  that this sup-
port.might  be  seen as  a  concomitant  to  the  aims  of the 
VIth Plan and  the  funds  needed  to. carry it through.  He 
strongly demanded  the  ordered  and  phased establishment  of 
the  Common  Market.  "The  cotton industry is firmly  opposed 
to  bringing forward  the  Rome  Treaty completion date"  he 
emphasized. 
- 13  -He  was  equally emphatic  on  the  conditions concerning  any 
resumption of the negotiations with the  United Kingdom. 
Britain's policy,  he  said,  sacrificed her cotton industry 
to  the  solidarity of the  Commonwealth  and  this had led to 
massive  imports  of Asian cottons  onto  the  British market. 
Simply  to  open  the  EEC  to  the  UK  would  mean  that Asian 
cottons would  flood  the  EEC  market  and  the  markets  of the 
Associated African and Malagasy States.  (Le  Mende, 
31  March  1966) 
4.  Professor Burgbacher's views  on energy supplies 
In an article which  appeared in "Industriekurier"  on 
2  April  1966,  Professor Burgbacher,  Chairman of the 
European Parliament's Energy Committee,  dealt with the 
energy  supply problem from  the  standpoint  of emergency 
supplies.  He  stressed the  need  for  supply security and 
advocated  an  energy  policy in which the  emphasis would 
lie  on value  for  money  and long-term supply  security. 
He  stressed that  today  the  energy problem was  no  longer  a 
purely national issue,  nor indeed  a  purely European one. 
It involved  the  whole  western world,  especially the 
European sector of NATO.  All  the  NAT9  member  countries 
spent vast  sums  of money  on  defence.  A start had  already 
been made  on setting on foot  effective  emergency  arrange-
ments  but  energy  problems  as  such had  so  far attracted 
little attention.  Any  emergency  arrangements  that failed 
to  take into  account  the  energy factor would  represent 
the  bones without  the  flesh if the  security of energy 
supplies were  not  correspondingly guaranteed.  He  there-
fore  felt it would  be  advisable  to include part of the 
costs involved in securing energy  supplies in the  defence 
budget under  the  heading  "emergency  arrangements".  He 
further observed no  statistics were  available in any  of 
the  NATO  States in Europe  showing what  the  energy need 
would  actually be  in the  event  of  a  crisis.  It had,  at 
all events,  to  be  conceded  that  no  one  today  could 
accurately evaluate what  the  energy needs in the  event  of 
a  crisis would  actually be.  It could  be  argued that,  by 
reducing supplies to  the  minimum  necessary, it would  be 
poss~ble to use  less energy  than at present  because  the 
energy  consumption of the  NATO  States,  which is already 
considerable,  could be  reduced if necessary. 
Professor Burgbacher referred  to  the  NATO  States'  increas-
ing dependence  on  energy imports  - 4o%  at present  and 
- 14  -likely to  rise  to  5o%  in the  foreseeable  future.  This 
trend had  to  be  watched  so  that  energy policy decisions 
did not lead to  the  wrong  policy being pursued.  In 
particular,  the  currently available  sources  of domestic 
energy  of every  type  had not  to  be  neglected for,  while 
energy prices  on  the  world market  were  low at present, 
there  was  no  guarantee  that  these  prices would  remain 
constant.  Hence  arrangements  had  to  be  made  for crises 
so  that sufficient fuel  and electricity remained  availab~ 
To  this end,  crude  oil had  to  be  stock-piled at refineries 
and  a  watch had  to  be  kept  on  the  security of petrol 
imports' and  the  special  situation of those  power  stations 
that could,  in the  event  of a  fall-off in energy imports, 
provide.current  from  domestic  sources.  Hence it was 
proposed  that  Germany  and  the  Common  Market  should tie 
half the  generation of electricity to  coal.  The  compet-
itiveness of electricity generated from  coal  as  compared 
with other primary  sources  of energy,  ought  to  be  secured 
by  means  of  a  perequation  system which  should  come  from 
the  emergency  supply funds.  The  financial  cost of  stock-
piling supplies  - in so  far as unproductive  plant were 
involved  - could  be  covered,  at least in part,  from  the 
emergency  supply fund.  The  supply network for gas, 
electricity and  oil had  to  be  expanded  so  that in the 
event  of  a  crisis,  energy  could  successfully be  diverted 
to  and  from neighbouring States. 
He  then went  on  to  analyze  the  possible  effects of crises 
varying  as  to  the  extent  of the  are.a affected in relation 
to  degrees  of energy  supply  security.  If there  were  a 
world-wide  crisis of  any length,  energy  supplies in the 
European  NATO  States would,  notwithstanding their disper-
sion,  be  threatened because  of  the  dependence  of these 
States  on imports.  In the  event  of local crises  on  a 
larger scale  and in crises limited to  specific  areas, 
stock-piling in neighbouring  areas  and  domestic  supplies 
available  could  supply  some  of the  energy required even in 
the  event  of  a  multilateral  snarl-up in the  transport 
system.  In the  event  of a  crisis,  domestic  supplies  and 
nuclear energy would  be  the least threatened for  the 
former  would  be  available  to  the  immediate locality and 
the latter would  lend itself to  space-saving underground 
storage.  For both these  types  of energy,  the  most  impor-
tant factor was  their need  for  support  from  emergency 
arrangement  funds.  This  protection should  be  provided 
through  the  substitution of European coal  for  imported 
coal  so  that  one  would  not  be left dependent  on imported 
coals.  With  this. proviso,  imported  energy could rise to 
6o%  of the  total energy needed  to  guarantee  security of 
supply for,  in the  event  of  a  limited crisis,  the  domestic 
supplies could  cover  the  need  over  the  short  term.  He 
- 15  -pointed out  that during  a  crisis the  most vulnerable 
areas would  be  the  conurbations,  although these  were  in 
most  cases  also  the  main centres of the  country's energy 
production.  For  this reason he  advocated  a  decentralized 
storage  system for all energy  sources in areas where  they 
would  be  used. 
In conclusion,  Professor Burgbacher  observed that this 
was  not very encouraging either for  the  energy sector or 
for  the  economy  as  a  whole.  With  a  view  to  a  responsible 
and  informed  supply policy,  however,  he  felt it necessary 
to point out  that in times  of crisis energy  stock-piles 
were  especially important;  unfortunately available  sup-
plies were  below  the necessary level.  He  recalled that 
during  the Korean crisis the  question of price had  sud-
denly  assumed lesser importance  and  the  concern to  cover 
total energy needs had  become  the first consideration. It 
could  be  seen at  a  glance,  he  said,  that little had  been 
done  as  yet  to  secure  energy  supplies within NATO  and  that 
in the  event  of  an  emergency,  there was  no  guarantee  that 
energy  could  be  supplied. 
On  the  occasion of the  60th anniversary of the  German 
Union of Certified Business Practitioners,  Professor 
Burgbacher referred in Dortmund  on  1  April  1966  to  the 
changes  that  the  Germans  wanted  to  make  in the  Treaty of 
Paris.  When  the  three  European Communities  were  merged, 
it had  to  be  established that  Germany's  five  partners not 
only had  a  right to call for  a  share in German  coal 
supplies but  that they  also  had  a  duty  to  purchase  a 
proportion of this coal. 
He  was  critical  of the  present  situation whereby  the 
nationalized French collieries were  allowed  to  operate 
centralized selling whereas  the  Ruhr mines  were  not 
allowed  to  do  so.  Whoever had  the right to  recourse  to 
German  coal in the  event  of need  ought  to  bear  a  propor-
tionate  share  of the  costs.  He  further  observed  that 
preliminary discussions had  revealed that all the  Commu-
nity countries were  ready  to maintain  the present  appor-
tionment  system  and  to  pay  their share  of the  cost  of 
protecting the  coal industry.- Germany's  Community  part-
ners proposed  that coal  should  be  subsidized from  a  levy 
on  competing fuels. 
Professor Burgbacher stated that Europe's  dependence  on 
energy imports would  increase  to  the  extent of  5o%  by 
1975 if the  same  amount  of coal  continued to  be  mined  or 
7o%  if production were  cut back.  He  indicated that 
American production which had  been cut  from 800  to  400 
million tons per  annum  could  be  expected  to increase 
- 16  -again by  the  year  1980  to  around  900  million tons  per 
annum  so  that  the  energy  available,  already  two  and  a 
half times  German  supplies,  would  increase still further. 
At  the  same  time  the  USSR,  which reckoned  to  treble its 
energy  output  by  1980,  would  be  doubling its present 
600  million ton annual  coal  production. 
(Professor F.  Burgbacher,  "Die  Sicherheit unserer Energie-
versorgung"  and  "Eine  Abna.hm.epflicht  fur Kohle",  Indus-
triekurier,  2  April  1966) 
5.  A statement on  "German  and  international  social  policy" 
by Dr.  E.G.  Erdmann,  Executive  Vice-President  of the 
Federation of German  Employers 
At  the  annual  general meeting of the  German  Iron and 
Metal  Industry Employers'  Federation held in Dusseldorf 
on  18  March  1966,  Dr.  Erdmann  spoke  on  "German  and inter-
national  social policy". 
He  noted in this  connexion that  the  present  situation 
with regard  to workers'  rights to  a  say in management  was 
a  particularly striking example  of the  difficulties 
involved in social harmonization in the  EEC.  He  explain-
ed  that in no  other country had  the  trade unions  such 
extensive rights under  company  law  as in Federal  Germany. 
There  was  no  real inclination to  change  the  present legal 
position.  He  stressed that  the  right of workers  to  a  say 
in management  obtained only in Germany,  with the  excep-
tion of the  workers'  representatives  on French Boards  of 
Management  whose  function,  moreover,  was  purely consulta-
tive. 
Germany  had  the  shortest working week  in the  EEC  and  the 
heaviest  social  service  commitments in the  Community. 
Dr.  Erdmann  observed with reference  to  the  right to  con-
clude  collective wage-agreements  that there  were  too  many 
divergencies which  stood in the way  of a  European  system 
of collective bargaining.  There  were  also difficulties 
connected with standardizing the  various national  social 
security  systems because  the  emphasis lay in different 
places according to  the  State involved. 
He  felt  that particular efforts were  called for with 
regard  to  the  protection of young workers  and with regard 
to maternity benefits.  Trade  qualifications had  to  be 
improved  and  manpower  mobility enhanced.  To  a  large 
extent,  the  EEC  Commission recommendations  on  the  protec-
- 17  -tion of young workers  followed  the pattern ef German law, 
which was  the  most  advanced in this field.  Apart  from 
which there were  a  few  further points that  came  within 
the  scope  of  the  EEC  Commission recommendations  such  as 
the  forty-hour week,  paid leave  for  training purposes  and 
the  establishment  of  a  minimum  age  (15)  for  starting work. 
In conclusion,  Dr.  Erdmann  stated:  "As  the  integration of 
the  EEC  Member  States progresses,  national  social policy 
will  assume  increasing significance in relation to  the 
collective responsibility.  It will,  however,  also  mean 
dispensing with the  bulk of industrial policy measures." 
(Industriekurier,  19  March  1966) 
- 18  -III.  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
1.  European  problems  and  thP- British General Election 
A.  Introduction 
On  the 500th,day  of his  coming  into office,  Mr.  Wilson 
announced  hi-s  decision to dissolve Parliament  and  to hold 
a  new  general  election.  The  Conservatives and  Liberals 
expressed  enthusiasm at Mr.  Wilson's intention,  although 
behind  .this  enthusiasm there was  only  a  semblance  of hope. 
Gallup  and  national  opinion polls gave  the  Prime Minister 
a  9  to  13  per  cent  lead  over  the Tories  and nearly all 
poll  surveys forecast  Mr.  Wilson's victory. 
The  election campaign which  only lasted  one  month  ending 
on  31  March  1966  was  comparatively  short  and  included 
several  Home  policy matters.  Wages,  prices,  industrial 
modernization,  exports,  taxes  - and,  following  the  WEU 
Conference held in London,  (1)  the  ~uestion of the United 
Kingdom's  accession to  the  EEC- were  in fact  the  main 
themes  of the  election campaign.  The  new  Government 
will have  to  pronounce  on  the  NATO  reform  and  say  "yes" 
or  "no"  to Britain's accession to  the  Common  Market. 
For  these  reasons,  Britain's allies followed  the  election 
campaign with considerable interest. 
B.  The  party lines 
In the  election campaign  the  Labour Party  stressed  the 
economic  and  social aspects  of the  party's policy while 
the  Conservatives  emphasized  European  themes.  It was 
France  that introduced,  through her· statement at the min-
isterial conference  of Western European Union held  in 
London  (1),  the  European  ~uestion into  the political 
arena.  In a  process  of political escalation the  two 
main British parties  embarked  on  the  European  ~uestion on 
eve~more widely  opposed  premises. 
(1)  See  in this connexion the  explanations  on  page  25. 
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manifesto  entitled "Action,  not  Words"  (1),.  The  Conser~ 
vative Party manifesto  covered 130  points,  115  of which 
concerned  Home  and  economic  policy matters.  It also 
contained  five  overriding aims,  including that  of Brit-
ain's accession to  the  EEC.  "We  are  determined  to give 
Britain a  respected  place  in the  world  again and  lead her 
into  the  European  Community''.  The  text  of  the manifesto 
stated: 
"Work  energetically for  entry into  the  European 
Common  Market  at  the first favourable  opportunity. 
Prepare for  entry by relating the  development  of 
our  own  policies to  those  of the  Common  Market, 
wherever appropriate. 
Encourage  co-operation with other European  countries 
in  joint projects which need  not  await  our member-
ship of  the  Common  Market:  particularly where 
large-scale scientific and  technological resources 
are  called for." 
The  manifesto  also  stated  thFit  "a  strong Britain can pro-
vide  a  powerful  trading partner,  and  a  growing  source  of 
skill,  knowledge  and  capital,  for  the  other members  of 
the  Commonwealth •••• That is why  we  shall  seize  the  first 
favourable  opportunity  of becoming  a  member  of the  Commu-
nity".  It referred in addition- to  some  extent  as  a 
preliminary requirement  - to  the  adjustment  of the  financ-
ing of British agriculture to  the  Common  Market  import 
tax  system. 
The  Conservative manifesto  found  unanimous  support  on  the 
~uropean issue,  even in the  Labour  press.  Mr.  Wilson  was 
urged  to  make  a  clear  statement  on Britain's accession to 
the  EEC.  The  Daily Mirror,  for  instance,  felt  that  this 
was  not  a  bad  start for Heath  and  his  Shadow  Cabinet  and 
that their clear and  unequivocal  stand  on  Europe  would 
force  Wilson  to  be  equally forthright  or  to bear the  con-
sequences  of any  other attitude.  The  Sun wrote  that 
Labour  should  also  clearly express ·the  need  to  join Eur-
ope.  The  Daily Mail  observed  that membership  of the 
Common  Marke·t  would  be  the  shortest way  to modernizing 
British industry.  It would  put  an  end  to Britain's insu-
lar position which  was  protected by  very high import 
duties. 
(l)  The  Guardian,  7 March  1966;  The  Times,  7 March  1966; 
The  Observer,  6  March  1966;  Le  Monde,  8  March  1966 
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Tories would  begin by  harmonizing British policy with 
Suropean policy.  Even  "The  Economist"  which,  in October 
1964,  had  come  out  in favour  of Mr.  Wilson's election, 
endorsed  the  Conservative  position on  European  policy in 
the  following words: 
"He  (Mr.  Heath)  began  the  campaign as  an  enigma  to 
most  of his audiences.  It is a  nice  question 
whether  a  discussion of  ~urope,  of agricultural 
pricing systems,  and  of the  future  of Nato  is the 
easiest way  of getting on  terms with an audience, 
and  especially with  some  Tory  audiences.  But, 
faced  with Europe,  Mr.  Heath's instinct was  to  say 
Yes.  He  was  right.  It was  an  answer  embedded  in 
his  career and  his political  judgment.  There  will 
have  to be  negotiations  on  the  terms  for Britain's 
entry.  But  those  negotiations will have  to  be 
based  on  a  British approach that  approximates  to 
th~  common  denominator  o~_policy agreed  among  the 
Six."(l) 
As  early as  1  March 1966,  Mr.  Edward  Heath had .stated in 
a  television interview that his Party was  ready  to  achie-
ve  Britain's accession to  the  Common  Market  at  the  first 
available  opportunity.  He  later amplified this state-
ment  by  saying that  the ·Six wanted Britain to  join the 
European  ~conomic Community.  In an article published in 
Le  Monde  (2)  Mr.  Heath declared that ·Britain wished  to 
join the  Common  Market  as  soon as  possible  and  was  pre-
pared  to  accept  the Rome  Treaties as  they  stood.  He 
added,  in this connexion that  other  countries  who  also 
believed in the  ideals of the  Community,  should  be  given 
the  possibility of becoming  members  or associates  of  the 
Common  Market. 
Mr.  Christopher  Soames,  Conservative  foreign policy 
spokesman  stated at  the  annual  conference  of the  Young 
Conservatives in London  that Britain should actively .pre-
pare herself for  entry into  the  Common  Market.  At  the 
(1)  "Should  he  go  back again?",  The  Economist,  No.  6369, 
29  March 1966,  page  1204 
(2)  "L'avenir de  l'Angleterre est  en  Europe  et le Traite 
de  Rome  doit  ~tre accepte tel quel;  le Royaume-
Uni  avant les elections legislatives";  Le  Monde, 
15 March 1966. 
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were  still considerable difficulties to  be  overcome  by 
the  Common  Market.  She  should  be  ready  to  face  these 
problems.  On  17 January  1966,  Mr.  Soames  had  stated,  in 
an  address  to  the  Anglo Belgian Association in Brussels, 
that Britain was  prepared  to  join the  Common  Market.  He 
felt that Europe  without Britain was  in the  long run as 
impossible  as  Europe  without  France.  The  Six  should 
always  bear in mind  the  problem of Britain's relations 
with the  EFTA  countries while,  on  the  other hand,  Britain 
should  evince willingness to  join the  EEC  and  to  accept 
the  principles of the  EEC  Treaty.  The  Conservative 
spokesman  pointed  out,  in this  connexion,  that  the  Con-
servative Government  had  approved  in 1961  the  system of 
majority decisions  on  the  Council  as well  as  the political 
independence  of the  EEC  Commission.  Nothing had  changed 
in their views up till now.  He  added  that  economic 
relations with Commonwealth  countries were  now  less sig-
nificant  and  the  Commonwealth realized  that Britain's 
destiny was  now  in Europe. 
Sir Alec  Douglas  Home,  the  former British Premier,  declar-
ed  in an article published in "Industriekurier"  (1)  that 
a  determined  and  prolonged isolation,  even in the  pa&t, 
would  have  proved neither useful nor possible as far as 
Britain was  concerned;  this was  all the  more  true in 
1966.  He  referred in this  connexion  to last year's Con-
servative  Conference,  when  he  had  declared that if Brit-
ain did  not  want  to  remain  a  small  point  on  the map,  out-
side  the  centres of gravity represented  by  the  Suropean 
Continent,  the United  States and  the  Soviet Union,  then 
she  must  accept  a  large part of her  histo~ical responsibi-
lities in Europe.  Sir Douglas  Home  stressed that  "Euro-
pean-mindedness"  had  increased in Britain,  particularly 
among  prominent  trade  and  industry leaders.  He  could 
not  imagine  that  these  men  would  ever  support  a  policy 
that  could  be  disastrous to  the  many  fields  of activity 
on  which  the  standard  of living of the British people 
depended.  The  former  Prime Minister described  the  econ-
omic  and  political arguments  in favour  of an unequivocal 
entry  of Britain into  the  ~EC as  overwhelming.  It was 
the  aim  of the  Conservatives  to  convince  everyone  in 
Britain and  in Europe  that  the  future  of Britain as  a 
nation was  bound  up with that  of the·Continent. 
In case  of a  Conservative victory at  the  General Election 
on  31  March 1966,  his Party would  make  immediate  prepar-
ations for Britain's entry into  the  EEC.  They  would 
(l)  Industriekurier,  Easter 196b 
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the  Six  and  with the  EEC  Commission.  He  reminded  those 
that  remained unconvinced  of what  President Kennedy  had 
said:  "We  regard  such a  Europe  as  a  partner with whom  we 
can discuss,  on  a  basis  of a  full  equality,  all the major 
tasks that have  to  be  carried  out in order to build  and 
defend  a  Community  of free nations." 
In its election manifesto  published  on  7  March  1966  the 
Labour Party  emphasized  that Britain would  be  prepared  to 
join the  EEC  after consulting her EFTA  partners and  ensu-
ring that essential British interests were  safeguarded. 
The  manifesto  clearly  showed  that Mr.  Wilson's Government 
was  not,  prepared  to  renounce its agricultural  system: 
"Th~ record  of  our  farmers  and  farm workers in increasing 
pr6ductivity is outstanding.  We  shall not  shake  their 
confidence  by  substituting for  the  well-tried deficiency 
payments  the levies  on  imported  foodstuffs  advocated  by 
the  Conservatives.  This  would  reduce  the  farmers'  secu-
rity and  push up  food  prices  ~to new  high levels".  The 
Labour manifesto  further  stated  (1): 
"In seeking  to relax tensions in Europe  we  need  to 
keep  the  confidence  of our allies and  to reach 
understanding with the  East.  We  must  be  both rea-
dy  to  reach  agreement  and  determined  to resist 
threats.  Labour,  therefore,  firmly  supports  NATO 
and  has greatly increased Britain's contact  and 
understanding with the  Soviet Union  and  other  coun-
tries of Eastern Europe. 
By  the  end  of this year Labour Ministers will have 
visited nearly all of those  countries.  By  such 
contact  we  shall  encourage  trade  and  travel  and  pro-
mote  that growth of trust which is essential  to 
progress  towards  disarmament  and  assured  peace. 
This  progress  towards  normalization of our relations 
with Eastern Europe  is an  essential part  of  our 
whole  European policy. 
Britain is a  member  of the  European  Free  Trade 
Association which is a  thriving organization bene-
ficial to us  and  to  our partners.  The  Labour  Gov-
ernment  has  taken the  lead in promoting an  approach 
by  EFTA  to  the  countries of the  European Economic 
Community  so  that Western Europe  shall not  be  sharp-
ly divided  into  two  conflicting groups.  Labour 
(1)  The  Times,  8  March 1966;  The  Guardian 1966. 
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EFTA  partners,  should be  ready  to  enter the  Europ-
ean  Economic  Community,  provided  essential British 
and  Commonwealth  interests are  safeguarded. 
The  Conservative  record  on relations between Brit-
ain and  the  "Six"  is one  of notorious  and  abject 
failure.  Yet  Conservatives  now  talk as if they 
could  take Britain into  the  Common  Market  without 
any  conditions or  safeguards. 
Labour believes that  close  contact with Europe  -
joint industrial ventures,  scientific co-operation, 
political  an~ cultural links  - can  produce  among 
the  "Six"  that understanding of Britain's position 
which is necessary  to  a  wider European unity." 
British public  opinion took a  very critical view of the 
Labour Party's position with regard  to  the  question of 
Britain's entry in the  Common  Market  as  set out in the 
manifesto.  Even left-wing papers regretted the reserva-
tions entered by  the  Government  Party  on European policy. 
While  "The  Economist"  had  criticized the  Labour Party's 
reticence  on Europe  even before  the  beginning of  t~e 
election campaign  (1),  the  Statist went  further in its 
criticism of the  way  in which Buropean policy was  refer-
red  to  in the  Labour manifesto: 
"The  Labour Party manifesto must  be  faulted  on  two 
counts.  The  first is the  pusillanimity with which 
it approaches British membership  of the  Common  Mar-
ket.  If there is one  way  to  galvanise  and  compel 
British industry  to  greater efficiency it is by 
opening  the  doors  both, to  the  competition and  the 
opportunities of the  great European market. 
Labour  says  that  'Britain should  be  ready to  enter 
the  European  Community'  but  on  conditions,  notably 
those  applying  to  agricultural policy,  which  reduce 
that  conditional  affirmative into  a  downright 
negative."(2) 
(1)  See  ''The  issue is Wilson",  The  Economist,  No.  6392, 
26  February 1966,  page  771  ff. 
(2)  "The  credibility of Mr.  Heath,_  P.M."  in Statist 
No.  4592,  11  March  1966,  p.  5~9.  ·' 
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at the  French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  at  the Minis-
terial Council  of Western European Union  in London,  name-
ly that the  EEC  would  welcome  Britain amongst its Members 
if there  were  no  prerequisites to  her accession,  surpris-
ed  not  only the  Labour  Government  but  even  turned  the 
subject into  a  major  issu.e  of the  election campaign. 
In this connexion,  it is interesting to  observe  that 
there is no  definite record  of Mr.  de  Broglie's actual 
statement.  In essence Mr.  de  Broglie  said no  more  than 
what  General  de  Gaulle  had  said  during  the  French presi-
dential  elections.  On  being asked  for  clarification, 
the  :~uay  d 'Orsay merely  pointed  out  that  the  French posi-
tion had  not  changed.  Far more  conclusive in this res-
pect  was  an article by Mr.  Couve  de  Murville,  the  French 
Foreign Secretary published in a  special issue  of Le 
Monde: 
"Rienne marquerait mieux la reussite  de  cette 
oeuvre  capitale  (achieving the  Economic  Community) 
que  son  extension a la Grande-Bretagne.  Le  jour 
ou  celle-ci decidera de  se  joindre  aux  Six  sans 
reserve,  elle repondrait  au  voeu  des  Europ~  car 
ceux-ci  pensent  que  les Britanniques doivent  de 
t'oute  maniere  partager le destin des  continentaux." 
(1) 
Of  particular interest are  the  words  "sans reserve"  which 
the Gaullist  paper  "La Nation"  was  still commenting  on at 
the  beginning  of  April  (2).  According  to  that article 
France  had  agreed  to Britain's  joining the  Six provided 
that Britain accepted  the  European agricultural policy as 
Paris wished it to  be  applied. 
At  a  press  conference at the  closing session of the  West-
ern European Union  conference  on 16  March  1966,  Mr. 
Stewart  expressed  satisfaction at  the  fact  that the  green 
light had  been given to  a  European Policy.  It was ra-
ther remarkable  to note  that Mr.  Stewart  stressed thefact 
that,  unlike  wnat  had  happened  in 1963,  when  the Bru8sels 
negotiations broke  down,  all the  Six  EEC  partners,  inclu-
(1)  "Un  message  de  M.  Couve  de  Murville,  Ministre  des 
Affaires Etrangeres",  Le  Monde,  ·15  March 1966. 
(2)  See  "La Nation",  4  April  1966 
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words  were: 
His  textual 
"It was  clear that France  does  believe it would  be 
desirable for Britain to  be  a  member  of EEC,  and 
that does  seem  to  me  to  be  a  healthier situation 
than that which  existed in 1963". (1) 
Mr.  Stewart  also  referred  to  the  existing difficulties in 
the  following words: 
"I  do  not under-estimate  the  very  considerable diffi-
culties there are  over British entry into  the  Cnm-
mon  Market:  I  do  not believe  these difficulties 
are  insuperable,  nor  do  I  think they  should  be 
under-estimated.  He  said that this was  the first 
meeting  of  WEU  since  the  Six had  resolved their own 
difficulties in the  agricultural  sphere,  and  they 
were  all able  to  discuss  economic  as well  as poli-
tical issues. 
M.  de  Broglie,  the  French delegate,  who  is Secret-
ary  of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  and 
a  politician,  not  an official,  made  no  reser~ations 
when  he  spoke  on Britain's  joining the  Community 
save  that it should  be  "in the  spirit of  the  Treaty 
of Rome". ( 1) 
Mr.  Stewart further  stated that Britain "ought  not  to  em-
bark on  formal  negotiations without  a  good  prospect of 
success".  That  would  involve  a  fair  amount  of prelimin-
ary discussion.  Mr.  Stewart  concurred with Mr.  Wilson 
and  Mr.  Brown  in describing the different  systems  of 
agricultural  support  in Britain and  in the  EEC  as  the 
main  obstacles.  Further obstacles,  in Mr.  Stewart's 
opini.nn,  were  the  problems  of EFTA  and  the  Commonwealth. 
He  stressed,  however,  that both these  problems  were  not 
worse  than in 1963  and,  in fact,  would  now  be  easier to 
solve  than they were  at the  time.  Asked  whether Britain 
would  be  prepared  to  accept  the Rome  Treaty provisions  on 
the majority principle in their present  form,  Mr.Stewart 
reserved his reply. 
At  a  Press  conference  on 16 March 1966,  the  Opposition 
leader referred to  the  statements made  by  the  Foreign 
(1)  The  Guardian,  17 March  1966. 
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including France,  had  said at the  WEU  conference  in 
London  that Britain's accession to  the  EEC  was  desirable, 
he  repeated  that the  Conservative  aim was  to  achieve  such 
entry  as  soon as  possible.  Mr.  Heath described  the  pos-
ition of the  Labour Foreign Minister as  "paralytic"  and 
went  on  to  say: 
"There is now  a  clear decision that all six members 
of the  Community,  including France,  want Britain to 
join.  We  Conservatives have  put  this issue  to  the 
forefront  of our  programme.  This is therefore  a 
vitally important  and  very welcome  development. 
The  Conservative Party has made  its point  clear 
unequivocally.  The  Labour Party says it cannot 
accept  the  common  agricultural policy.  Mr.  George 
Brown  has been going round  East  Anglia this after-
noon  arguing against  tne  common  agricultural pol-
icy.  He  says it is impossible  to  accept  an in-
crease in agricultural prices. 
Mr.  Wilson,  at his press  conference  launching 
Labour's manifesto  stated plainly that the  common 
agricultural  policy must  be  abandoned.  And  the 
Labour Party is still committed  to its other four 
conditions  for  entry. 
Unless  the  Labour Party unequivocally abandons its 
present position,  negotiations for  entry  cannot 
begin.  The  plain fact is that it is the  Conserva-
tive Party,  with all its knowledge  and  experience 
of Europe,  with a  clear policy for  entry into  the 
Community,  which is best  able  to  see  the  opportunity 
offered by  today's meeting of the Western European 
Union."  ( 1) 
The  Chancellor  of the Exchequer,  Mr.  Callaghan,  reacted 
to  Mr.  Heath's remarks  by  stating:  "We  must  beware  of 
falling  over  ourselves at the  slightest lifting of  the 
skirt of the  Common  Market".  Mr.  Callaghan referred to 
the  advantages,  from an industrial viewpoint,  that  would 
derive  from Britain's entry into the  Common  Market; 
access  to  a  larger market  was  certainly desirable for  the 
(1)  "Mr.  Heath makes  Europe  a  major  issue",  The  Guardian 
17 March 1966. 
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done,  some  very  complicated negotiations would  be  neces-
sary,  and  these  would  take  a  long time:  In his opinion 
the  present  common  agricultural policy was  not  only de-
trimental  to Britain but  also  to  some  EBC  countries. 
In view of the  fact  that  the  WEU  Ministerial Council  con-
ference  had  given primary  importance  to  the  European 
issue raised at the General  Election,  the Prime  Minister 
made  ca  very detailed  statement  of this problem in a  talk 
given in Bristol  on 16  March 1966.  He  stated in effect 
that accession was  not  a  panacea to all British economic 
problems.  Expanding Britain's economic  space  was  admit-
tedly a  great advantage  for  the  scientific and  technical 
industries,  but this  should  not lead  to  the  assumption 
that keener  competition from goods  imported duty  free 
would  make  British industry more  economic.  More  than 
that  was  needed  to  extricate British industry from its 
apathy.  In the first place  certain prerequisites had  to 
be  met,  as  otherwise Britain would  only  be  exchanging her 
industrial leeway  outside  the  EEC  for  stagnation inside. 
Britain would  first have  to  achieve  a  position of streng-
th from  which  she  could negotiate  the right  conditions 
for  entry into  the  EBC.  The  Prime Minister went  ~n to 
say: 
"The  Government  regards recent  statements in France, 
and  in the Ministerial Conference  of Western 
European Union held in London  this week,  as  remov-
ing  one  major  impediment  to Britain  joining the 
~ropean ~conomic Community,  if suitable  terms  and 
conditions  can be  agreed ••.••• 
The  Government's  position,  as  we  have  stated again 
and  again,  is that  we  are  ready  to  join if suitable 
safeguards for Britain's interests,  and  our  Common-
wealth interests,  can be  negotiated.  But,  unlike 
the  Conservative leader,  we  shall not  proceed  on 
the basis of an unconditional  acceptance  of  what-
ever  terms  are  offered us. 
We  shall be  ready  for  contacts,  for  informal dis-
cussions  through  the  proper  channels,  for  any  pro-
bings that might  be  necessary  to  assess the  kind  of 
terms  on  which Britain might  join. 
And  this process  of probings  and  consultations we 
shall undertake  with and  through,  and  not  behind 
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the  backs  of our EFTA  partners.  Last May,  Britain 
proposed  an initiative designed  to  build  a  bridge 
between EFTA  and  EEC,  to  end  the  economic  division 
of Western  Europe,  indeed it was  aimed ultimately 
at  a  more  intricate trading relationship in a  wider 
European  context. 
The  Conservatives urge us  to  accept  whatever  terms 
we  are  offered.  They  assert that  our grave  doubts 
about  the  effects of the  Common  Market  agricultural 
policy mean  that  we  have  rejected in advance  any 
possibility of  joining Europe.  We  are not  so  de-
featist,  and  we  are  certainly not  so  naive.  Nor, 
if we  needed  advice  would  we  go  to  those  respon-
sible for  the  disastrous posture in which Britain 
negotiated at Brussels. 
What  we  face,  if as  a  result of our  probings  fav-
ourable  conditions are  seen to  exist,  is ',tough 
negotiation.  Nothing~ould be  worse,  if vital 
British and  Commonwealth interests are  to  be  safe-
guarded,  to  enter those negotiations,as we  did 
before,  cap in hand,  and if we  were  to  state as  our 
opponents  in this  country now  state,  that  we  shall 
accept whatever  conditions are  offered us. 
And  those  conditions require ·that  we  must  be  free 
to  go  on buying  food  and  raw materials,  as  we  have 
for 100  years  in the  cheapest markets  - in Canada, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  other  Commonwealth 
countries  - and  not  have  this trade  wrecked  by  the 
levies the  Tories are  so  keen  to  impose  on agricul-
tural  products. 
For  what  the. Tories propose  would  mean: 
1.  An  unacceptable  increase in the  cost  of living, 
and  hence  in wages  and  export  costs; 
2.  An  unacceptable  increase in our  imports bill, 
which would  wreck  any  hope  of paying our way, 
and 
3.  A total disruption of our trade with Common-
wealth countries. 
We  are not unila.teral  economic  disarmers.  So  neg-
otiations?  Yes.  Uncond~tional acceptance  of 
whatever  terms  we  are  offered?  No. 
- 29  -We  believe  that given the right conditions,  it 
would  be  possible  and  right to  join EEC  as  an  econ-
omic  community.  But  we  reject any  idea  of supra-
national  control  over Britain's foreign  and  defence 
policies.  We  are in Europe,  but  our  power  and 
influence  are not,  and  must  never  be,  confined  to 
Europe. 
But if the  conditions are right  and  we  are  able  to 
enter the  wider  community  from  a  situation of in-
dustrial  strength,  we  shall be  facing  a  challenging 
adventure,  but real  strength must  come  from within 
ourselves,  what  we  are  prepared  to  do  in Britain and 
for Britain,  for  there is no  escape  from reality." 
(1) 
The  Prime Minister's Bristol  speech  on  European  policy 
produced  an unfavourable reaction from British public-
opinion.  Mr.  Jo  Grimmond,  Liberal leader,  described  the 
reiteration by Mr.  Wilson  of the  Labour Party's  co~diticns 
for  entry as  a  renewed  rejection of the  EEC  "which made 
Britain the  laughing  stock of Europe".  The  "Sunday 
Times"  described  the  Bristol  speech as  "one  of the most 
important failures  of  judgment  that has  ever been made  in 
the  course  of  a  British General  Election". 
Even  the  Daily Mirror  (Labour)  violently disagreed  with 
Mr.  Wilson's  pronouncement  and  pointed  out  that the 
question of Britain's entry into  the  Common  Market  was 
much  too  important  to  be  drawn  into  the  electoral fight 
between Mr.  Heath  and  Mr.  Wilson.  In the  paper's 
opinion,  Mr.  Wilson's words  would  only induce bitter dis-
appointment  in Europe.  His  conditions  would  be unaccep-
table  to  the  continental members  of the  EEC  and  one 
wondered  whether Mr.  Wilson really wanted  to  join the 
Common  Market  or whether he  wanted  to  destroy it.  The 
Sun  (also  Labour)  wrote  that Britain must  join the  Common 
Market if she  did  not  want  to  run  the risk of losing her 
well-being  and  influence.  The  paper  described Mr. 
Wilson's  speech as  shilly-shally and  vague:  if the  Five 
were  not  prepared  to  revise  the  EEC  Treaty in France's 
favour  during  the  EEC  crisis,  they would  be  even less 
(1)  "Prime Minister non-committal  about  the  Six",  The 
Guardian,  19 March  1966. 
- 30  -prepared  to  do  so  in order  to facilitate Britain's acces-
sion.  As  for  The  Economist,  it expressed  the  following 
view  on Mr.  Wilson's Bristol speech: 
"There  was  no  recognition of the  other side  of thP. 
argument,  of the  economic,  political and  historical 
advantages  of union with Europe  ••••. "(1) 
The  New  Statesman welcomed  Mr.  Wilson's undecided  view  on 
Britain's entry into  the  Common  Market  in the  following 
words: 
"There  is substance  in the  Prime Minister's conten-
tion that  thP.  prospects  and  thP.  available  terms 
should  be  coolly  studied~  Not  even an  informed 
guess  can be  made  as  to  the  effect of  joining the 
Common  MarkP.t  on  the British economy  and  standard 
of living."(2) 
It should  also  be  noted  that~he National  Farmers'  Union 
did  not  support  the  Conservative  policy  on  Europe  for 
fear  of raising food  prices and rather tended  to  endorse 
the  position of the  Labour  Government  regarding European 
agricultural policy.  In a  publication on  agricultural 
policy,  the National  Farmers'  Union  stated the  following: 
"The  Conservative Party have  apparently withdrawn 
from  thP.ir  earlier position and  seem prepared  to  go 
into  the  Community  on  the  basis of the  common  agri-
cultural policy being laid down  by  the  Six. 
The  question to  be  faced  is whether  a  future Brit-
ish Government  must  shelve its own  responsibility 
for  the  food  policy of a  nation of  53  million 
people  and  accept  for  the  UK  a  policy decided upon 
in Brussels by  a  group  of  Governments  at discuss-
ions in which it had  no  part.  If the UK  accepts 
unconditionally  the regulations which have  been 
adopted  in Brussels,  it will be  doing what  no  mem-
ber  of  the  Six was  prepared  to  do. 
The  terms  of the  Conservative manifesto,  with its 
implications  of unconditional  entry,  leave  no  room 
{l)  "Should  he  go  back again?",  The  Economist,  No.  6369, 
26  March 1966,  page  1204. 
(2)  "Common  sense  about  Europe",  New  Statesman,  No.  1828, 
24  March 1966,  page  409. 
- 31  -for  arrangements  for  any  loss of  income  resulting 
from  the  adoption of the  Community's  regulations. 
The  union is concerned  that the  future  of the agri-
cultural industry in this  country  should  not  be 
sacrificed in favour  of the  piecemeal  Community 
arrangements  which,  however  suitable  they may  be 
for  the  Six,  are markedly inferior to  the  coherent 
policy  on which  our  system is based ••• 
It is impossible  to  make  an accurate  estimate  of 
the magnitude  of the  increase in retail prices if 
we  were  in the  Common  Market ••••  One  of  the  fac-
tors  that  cannot  easily be  allowed  for is the 
effect of higher  food  prices  on  demands  for in-
creases in wages  and  salaries and  hence  on  the 
general level  of  costs  and  prices ••.•  (1) 
Two  statements which must  be  regarded  as  positive,  were 
made  by  the  Labour Party during the  election campaign. 
Lord  Brown,  Minister of State at the  Board  of  Trade~ 
stated at the  48th International Fair in Lyon  on  2~ 
March  that  the  Labour  Government  would  gladly consider 
the  prospect  of resuming negotiations for Britain's entry 
into  the  Common  Market  provided it obtained  a  sufficient 
majority at  the  General  Election.  He  expressed  satis-
faction at the  French  statement at  the  London  WEU  Confer-
ence  and  added  that  the  Commonwealth  countries had  exten-
ded  the  scope  of their trade relations and  were  now  less 
perturbed at Britain's accession to  the  SEC  than  a  few 
years  ago.  On  29  March  1966,  Mr.  Wilson declared  to  the 
Daily Mirror that he  had  envisaged  for  some  time  the 
appointment  of a  Minister for  European Affairs,  i.e. 
responsible  for relations with the  EEC  and  EFTA,  as well 
as for major political problems.  He  also  stated: 
"Together with  our  EFTA  partners  we  shall  enter into 
negotiations with the  Common  Market  countries.  If we 
are  offered  favourable  conditions,  then  we  shall  join the 
E~C.  However,  we  shall not  enter under  any  terms  be-
cause  we  have  to  take  into  account British and  Common-
wealth interests."  (The  Daily Mirror had  given the 
opportunity to  the  leaders of all British parties to  ex-
press their views  in a  series of articles on  the main 
issues of the  election campaign.) 
Following the  Conservatives  and  the  Labour Party,  the 
(1)  "National  Farmers'  Union attacks Tory  policy  on 
Europe",  The  Guardian,  29  March  1966. 
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(1).  In this,  the  Labour Party made  Britain's accession 
to  the  European Economic  Community  the  main object  of 
Liberal foreign poli·cy.  In the  part dealing with Europe, 
the manifesto reads under  the  title "To  join Europe": 
"To  play  our  part in Europe  would  not  only be  of 
great  economic  benefit it would  make  us  a  pioneer 
in the first  supranational  community  where  States 
have  agreed  to  share  some  of their sovereignty. 
Liberals want  the  Government  to dsclare its inten-
tion of  joining the  EEC  at  the  earliest opportunity. 
O~ce in Europe,  Britain could  be  an  effective 
Atlantic ally and  with our  fellow-Europeans  we 
could  hope  to  influence American  policy in places 
like Vietnam.  Liberals believe in the late Presi-
dent Kennedy's  concept  of the Atlantic partnership 
between  the  USA  and  United  Europe.  Such  a  part-
nership would  wield great  power  for  progress." 
It was  largely thanks  to Mr.  Heath,  Conservative  Opposi-
tion Leader,  that  the  question of Britain's entry into 
the  Common  Market,  assumed  full  significance in the  elec-
tion  campaign.  Premier Wilson,  will now  have  to  show 
that he  is not  as  anti-European as he  seemed  to  be  at 
times  during the  election campaign.  The  first  step that 
is now  generally awaited is a  firm  statement by  the  Head 
of the  Government  to  the  effect that he  intends to  lead 
his  country  into  the  EEC,  or as  the  Economist  puts it: 
"The  Prime Minister's first and  most urgent  job 
abroad is to  start Britain on  the  road  into  ~rope. 
Though  the  British do  not realise it, they  are al-
ready  in the  thick of the  politics of European 
integration.  Britain enters into  the  calculations 
of all six common  market  countries because  General 
de  Gaulle's Realpolitik has  so  destroyed  the  old 
trust between  them  that they  need Britain in there 
with  them  to restore their balance  and  mutual  con-
fidence.  And  in Britain itself the  electoral  cam-
paign has  sho.wn  how  strongly,  for all Mr.  Wilson's 
evident  personal distaste,  the  tide is flowing  to-
wards  Europe. 
So  the  new  government will have  the historic re-
(1)  The  Guardian,  ll March 1966. 
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into  the  common  market."(l) 
After  the General  Election,  Mr.  Wilson  stated at a  Press 
Conference  that his Government  was  determined  to make  use 
of  every available  opportunity,  subject  to  conditions 
being acceptable.  He  pointed  out in this connexion, 
thR.t  there  was 1 1at  present  no  sign of  a  change  of atti-
tude  on  the  part  of the  Six.  Exploratory talks with the 
Governments  of the  Six EEC  States were  in Mr.  Wilson's 
own  words  a  "continuing process". 
In fact,  the British Premier  found  a  dual  solution to  the 
sharing of responsibility for European matters:  Mr. 
George  Brown,  First Secretary of State  and  Secretary of 
State for  Economic  Affairs,  will be  responsible  for  the 
economic  aspects of Britain's European  policy.  Mr. 
George  Thomson,  who  was  Minister of State,  Foreign 
Office,  in the  previous  Government,  will now  be  Chancel-
lor of the  Duchy  of Lancaster  and  responsible for politi-
cal relations with the  European  organizations  (EEC,  EFTA, 
WEU,  NATO  and  OECD). 
In a  speech delivered at a  banquet given  on  21  April  1966 
Mr.  George  Thomson  made  his first public  statement  as 
"Minister for Europe".  According  to  this,  relations be-
tween Britain and  Europe  were  the most  important  aspect 
of his country's future  foreign policy.  The  Minister 
went  on  to  say  that it would  be his duty  to  explain 
British policy to  Europe.  He  would  endeavour  to  achieve 
a  closer relationship between Britain and  Europe  so  as  to 
create  a  favourable  atmosphere  for Britain's entry under 
suitable  conditions.  Mr.  Thomson  stated that  to  him 
Europe  meant  the  whole  of Europe,  East  and  West,  as well 
as  EFTA  Europe  and  EEC  Europe.  With regard  to  the  oft-
mentioned  Labour  conditions for  entry into  the  EEC,  par-
ticularly during the  election campaign,  Mr.  Thomson  said 
that he  did  not  mean  the  laying down  of conditions  which 
could  be  used  as  an  excuse  for  keeping  away  from  the 
Community.  He  only  expected that Britain's difficulties 
would  be  taken into  account,  as  was  the  case when  the 
signatories to  the  Rome  Treaty  defended  their interests 
before  signing that Treaty. 
Mr.  George  Brown,  the  Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs,  stated  on  25  April  1966  in ~ondon at a  discussion 
(1)  "The  road  into  Europe",  The  Economist,  No.  6397 
2  April  1966,  page  17. 
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now  in Britain a  political desire  to  join the  Common 
Market.  Mr.  Brown  added,  however,  that it would  be  un-
realistic to  imagine  that British membership  of the  Com-
mon  Market  could  be  achieved in the  immediate  future. 
Mr.  Brown  was  speaking  on  behalf of Mr.  George  Thomson, 
Chancellor  of the  Duchy  of Lancaster  and  responsible  for 
European Affairs in the  Foreign Office,  who  had  been 
taken  i 11.  ·  He  came  out in particular against  the  opin-
ion that his Government  had  taken  a  negative attitude in 
regard  to  the  EEC  question.  No  Government  could  be  ex-
pected  to  agree  to  enter into  arrangements  which  were  of 
fundamental  significance for  the  country's  economic  and 
trade  policy,  unless  proper  care had  been  taken before-
hand  that  such agreements  did not  prejudice national 
interests.  That  was  why  talks  on  the  conditions under 
which Britain would  be  joining the  European Economic  Com-
munity  should  be  an  important  part  of  every  stage  towards 
Britain's membership  of  the  ~EC.  On  21  April  1966, 
the  .~ueen' s  Speech at  the  op-ening  of the  new Parliament, 
stressed Britain's fundamental  readiness  to  join the  Com-
mon  Market: 
"My  Government  will  continue  to  promote  the  economic 
unity of  ~urope and  to  strengthen the links between 
the  European  Free  Trade  Association and  the  Europ-
ean Bconomic  Community.  They  would  be  ready  to 
enter the  European  Economic  9ommunity  provided  es-
sential British and  Commonwealth  interests were 
safeguarded.  They  will  work for tariff reductions 
under  the  General  Agreement  on Tariffs and  Trade 
and  for  an  expansion of Commonwealth  trade. 
Further steps will be  taken to assist my  peoples  in 
the  remaining  colonial territories to reach inde-
pendence  or  some  other status which  they have  free-
ly chosen."(l) 
2.  Danish Prime Minister's visit to Paris 
On  l~ April,  Mr.  Krag,  Danish Prime Minister,  visited 
Paris where  he  was  received by President  de  Gaulle.  He 
(1)  See  text of the Queen's Speech in The  Guardian, 
22  April  1966. 
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the  Common  Market,  he  said,  had  been discussed,  with  par-
ticular reference  to  the  special difficul  tie.s facing 
Danish  exports as  a  result of the  agricultural agreements 
between  the  Six. 
"I  suggested;'  he  said, "that a  Franco-Danish Committee 
should  be  set up  to discuss how  these  problems  could  be 
solved.  This  suggestion was  very well  received  and  will 
now  be  examined  through  the  normal  diplomatic  channels." 
Mr.  Krag mentioned  that Denmark had  similar bilateral 
liaison committees with  the United  Kingdom  and  Western 
Germany  and  there  was  an  BEC-Denmark  Consultative  Commit-
tee  in Brussels.  "I  hope,"  he  added, "that we  shall be 
able  to  come  to  an  arrangement  that will protect Danish 
interests." 
In reply  to  a  journalist who  asked under  what  conditions 
Denmark  would  agree  to  accede  to  the  Common  Market,  Mr. 
Krag  replied:  "Under  the  same  conditions  as the United 
Kingdom."  ("Le  Figaro",  19  April  1966) 
3.  Government  statement  by  Mr.  Klaus,  Austrian Chancellor, 
un  ~EC questions. 
On  20  April  1966,  Federal  Chancellor Josef Klaus  presen-
ted  to  the  National  Council in  Vien~a his new  Cabinet 
which,  for  the  first  time,  was  composed  entirely of mem-
bers  of  the  Austrian People's Party,  and  delivered  the 
governmental  address. 
\Vhile  domestic  policy matters  predominated  in the  first 
part  of his  speech,  the  second  part was  entirely devoted 
to  foreign  policy which,  he  felt,  had  to  be  based  on re-
liable principles that  were unaffected  by  party strife 
and  the  vagaries  of  political life.  Austria would  stand 
by her  international  and  treaty obligations  and  her re-
lations with the  major  powers  would  be  based  on mutual 
trust.  Complete  independence  was  only possible  for 
Austria,  he  felt,  if she  succeeded  in consolidating her 
sources  of  supply  and  export  opportunities  on  the  tradi-
tional markets  and  kept  up  full  employment  at home. 
In this  connexion,  he  pointed  out  that  the  "special agree-
ment"  which. Austria was  endeavouring  to  conclude  with  the 
EEC  would  be  consistent with her neutrality and  that its 
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I implementation would  not raise  any  insuperable  technical 
difficulties.  For this reason,  negotiations had  to  be 
pursued  as  soon as  possible in order  to  reach early  agre~ 
ment.  His  Government  would  direct its every effort to 
this end.  He  referred again to  the  ~EC problem in con-
nexion with his country's  economic  policy  and  said  that 
Austria's foreign  trade  statistics clearly  showed  that  tbe 
main  areas  of  expansion  of the  economy  lay in interna-
tional trade in goods  and  services with  the  EEC. 
At  a  press reception given by  the  Austrian Delegation to 
the  Council  of Surope,  Mr.  Bock,  Vice-Chancellor,  stated 
that  the  form  of  future  relations with  SFTA  would  depend 
on  the  6utcome  of  the  negotiations with  the  EEC  as  would 
Austria's participation in the  final  customs  reductions 
under  the  3FTA  Treaty.  Austria had  entered reservations 
on  this point at  the  Lisbon Conference  in 1964  and  she 
would  raise it again at  the  forthcoming  meeting  of  the 
~FTA Council  of Ministers in Norway. 
In this  connexion,  it was  to  be  noted  that  the  Austrian 
People's Party,  in governmental  negotiations with the 
Austrian Socialist Party,  advocated  that,  in view  of the 
association negotiations in progress  in Brussels,  Austria 
shouJd  not  make  the  further  20%  reduction in EFTA  customs 
duties  on  1  January  1967.  The  Austrian People's Party, 
engaged  in building an association with  the  EEC,  would 
defer  any  final decision  on  this  po~nt until it could  do 
so  in the light of  the negotiations with  the  EEC. 
A}though  the Austrian People's Party still took the  view 
that  the  country's  economic  structure  could  only be  im-
proved  over  the  long  term if Austria  joined the  E~C,  the 
Socialists in the  previous  coalition government  had  not 
come  out  against  an  agreement  with Brussels;  they would, 
however,  probably have  opposed  Austria's leaving  EFTA 
even if Brussels had  made  this  a  membership  condition. 
In the  debate  that  followed  the  Government  statement,  Dr. 
Bruno  Kreisky  (Socialist),  former  foreign minister,  dis-
cussed  Austria's neutrality.  In well-chosen words  he 
explained  that this was  above  all a  foreign policy matter 
and  that the Socialists would  be  particularly interested 
to  know  Switzerland'·s  opinion  on this point.  He  called 
for  ~n early parliamentary debate  on  the  EEC  and  he 
asked:  "What  line is this country's neutralist policy to 
take  now?  It used  to  be  a  matter for  agreement  between 
the  two  parties that  formed  the  Government". 
In the  new  Government  formed  by  Chancellor Klaus,  Mr. 
Luljo Tonic  Sorinj  was  Foreign Minister,  Mr.  Carl Bobleter 
- 37  -was  Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  and  Mr- Karl 
Gruber,  former  Foreign Minister,  was  Secretary of State 
at the  Chancellory.  Mr.  Fritz Bock,  who  had  formerly 
led  the  Austrian Delegation t.o  the  EEC  negotiations.  re-
mained  Foreign Trade Minister and  also  took  Qn  tne  oft·l.ce 
of Vice-Chancellor.  (Die  Welt,  16,  20,  21,  23,  26  April 
1966;  Industriekurier,  19  and  21  April,  1966;  Neue 
ZUrcher  Zeitung,  22  and  23  April 1966). 
4.  Dr.  Schroeder,  German  Foreign Minister,  on  the 
rapprochement  between Spain and  the EEC. 
On  28  March  1966,  Dr.  Schroeder went  on  a  four-day visit 
to  Spain.  On  his arrival he  said  "Germany  and  Spain 
have  a  similar European responsibility which neither can 
evade.  We  shall be  discussing this in depth".  He  also 
spoke  of the  "friendship and  co-operation of our  two 
countries at a  particularly difficult  time"  - an  obvious 
reference  to  the  NATO  crisis. 
In an interview with the  Spanish  journal  "ABC"  he  said 
that Spanish policy had  made  great strides towards  step-
ping up  co-operation between Spain and  Germany.  He  re-
ferred first  to  co-operation in the  context of relations 
between  Spain and  Germany  and  went  on in the next  sen-
tence  to  speak of Spain's relations with the EEC.  He 
said  that  the  German  Government  was  anxious  to  achieve  a 
rapprochement with Spain,  which also  involved the  E~C. 
Since  1962,  the  Spanish GovPrnment  had  directed its 
efforts at achieving  a  rapprochement  with the  EEC,  but 
had  so  far been turned  away  from Brussels.  A majority 
of the  EEC  Council  had  called for  - albeit not  explicitly 
- "certain pre-conditions"  that had  to  be  met  before 
Spain's association could  be  contemplated.  Over  the 
past twelve  months,  on  the  other hand,  Spain had  been re-
viewing  the  possibilities of an alternative policy;  the 
Spanish Government  was  not  convinced  that agreement  on 
the  Council  of Ministers  could  be  reached  solely with the 
help of the  German  and  French Governments. 
On  Spanish television,  Dr.  Schroeder  spoke  of the  friend-
ship between  the  two  countries and  of the  progress in 
economic  and  social developments.  He  stressed again 
Germany's willingness to  support  Spain's association w~th 
the  EEC.  This was  not  solely 1.n  the  1.nterest of  Spain; 
- 38  -it was  also  a  vital need  for  the  whole  of Europe.  In 
the  final  nress  communique,  Mr.  Schroeder  spoke  of 
Germany's  desire  to  accelerate negotiations on Spain's 
association with the  Common  Market.  The  main  themes  of 
the  four-day  talks were  economic  integration in Europe 
and  the  security of the  free  world.  Both parties had 
agreed  to  try and  increase  trade  and  to  continue  the  talks 
as  soon  as  possible. 
In  a  statement  to  the  press made  in DUsseldorf  on  6  April 
1966,  the  German  Trade Union  Congress  (DGB)  rejected  any 
membership  of Spain in the  BEC  in strong  terms.  It re-
ferred  to  the  proposal  made  in Spain by Dr.  Schroeder  and 
rejected it out  of hand.  The  DGB  argued  that  the  entry 
of countries like Spain,  would  distort  the  nature  and 
purpose  of the  ~~C and  sap its democratic  foundations. 
At  the  same  time,  the  DGB  called for  the restoration of  a 
democratic  regime  in Spain.  (Die  Welt,  2g  March  1g66: 
Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zei tung,  29, ':30  and  31  March  1966 
and  1  April  1966;  Neue  ZUrcher  Zeitung,  8  April  1966) 
5.  Debate  on  European integration in the  Swedish Diet 
On  23  March 1966,  the  Swedish Diet held  a  debate  on 
foreign  policy  problems  in which  tue  main  focal  points 
were  Vietnam,  Rhodesia,  Cyprus  and  the  disarmament  talks 
in Geneva.  As  was  the  case  at the Western  ~ropean 
Union  meeting in London,  the revival  of talKs  on European 
integration tended  to fall into  the  background. 
Mr.  Erlander,  Prime  Minister and  Mr.  Nilsson,  Foreign 
Minister,  said in a  statement  made  in both Chambers  of 
the  Swedish Diet  that no  new negotiations with  a  view  to 
settling the  problems  of European integration were  to  be 
expected  in the  near future.  Mr.  Erlander  said that  the 
pace  of progress in the  EEC  had  slackened because it still 
had  difficult internal technical  problems  to  solve.  The 
United  Kingdom  was  hardly to  be  expected  to  enter into 
new negotiations with the  Six unless  there  were  some  pros-
pect  of a  successful  conclusion.  There  were  major  pro-
blems still outstanding,  such as agricultural policy, 
foreign  exchange,  and  the United  Kingdom's  relations with 
the  Commonwealth  and  with  EFTA. 
It emerged  from  the  debate held in the  Swedish Diet  that 
the  Government  wanted  first to  await  developments  and  that 
it was  following  the  progress  of·European  integration with 
\ 
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betwee!l  the United  Kingdom  and  the  EEC  ought not  to  be 
initiated unless  the  ground  were  prepared first.  If 
accession to  the  ~EC were  open  to  the United Kingdom,  it 
ought  to  be  possible  for  Sweden  and  her  EFTA  partners to 
come  to  some  agreement  with the  European  Economic  Commun-
ity.  In any  case it was  the  Swedish Government's un-
qualified desire  to  see  a  united European market  as  soon 
as  possible.  In the  course  of  the  debate  Mr.  Lange, 
Minister for  Commerce,  stressed that  Sweden would  only 
c6ntemplate  membership  of the  E~C when  the  danger  of  a 
supranational  organization being built,  in compliance 
with  the  principles  of the  Treaty  of Rome,  had  been re-
moved. 
With regard  to  the  EFTA  problem,  the  Swedish Government 
felt that  the  organization of the  Seven was  on  the  way  to 
becoming  a  full-scale  free  trade area;  customs  duties  on 
industrial products  were  due  to  be  eliminated next year. 
While  understanding  the  critical foreign  trade  position 
of the United  Kingdom,  the  Swedish Government  considered 
it unthinkable  that all EFTA  countries  except Britain 
should  remove  all their duties while Britain,  the  biggest 
Member  State,  maintained  a  10%  import  surcharge  t~t made 
her tariff protection higher than  Sweden before  the  EFT~ 
was  founded.  The  Government  emphasized  that it was  re-
lying on  the  removal  of the remaining British import 
duties by  the  end  of the year. 
Although  trade relations between  the  Nordic States had 
increased  to  a  surprising extent within the  EFTA  frame-
work,  Sweden had  been  disappointed that her move  to  in-
crease  co-operation with the  other Nordic  States had  met 
with little response.  It had  been hoped  that  concrete 
guide  lines  could  be  drawn up  on  the  Nordic  Council  for 
far-reaching  studies into  the  possibilities of closer  co-
operation,  stated  a  Swedish Government  communique.  In 
addition,  the  Government  had  declared its great interest 
in increasing trade with the East European  countries; 
this was  expected  to rise by  4  to  5%  in the  next year. 
Any  further  increase  in this volume  of trade would  depend 
on  the  East  European  countries'  increasing their exports. 
(Neue  ZUrcher  Zeitung,  27  March  1966) 
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relations between  the  EEC  and  Latin America 
On  a  three day official visit to  Chile  (21-23  April)  Mr. 
Emilio  Colombo,  Italian Minister for  the  Treasury,  met 
Mr.  Frei,  President  of the Republic,  Mr.  Santa Maria, 
Minister for  the  Economy  and  Mr.  Saez,  Vice-President  of 
the  Development  Corporation.  Before  leaving for Lima, 
to  attend  the Fifth World  Congress  of Christian Democrat 
Parties,  he  gave  an  interview on relations between  the 
European Economic  Community  and  Latin America. 
In reply to  a  question as  to  what  the  EEC  might  do  to 
stimulate  economic  and  social progress in the Latin Amer-
ican countries,  he  said that  the  EEC  States were  under-
going  an integration process that was  "far more  incisive 
and  penetrating than  a  straightforward  customs union". 
"This  process,"  he  said,  "has ;imparted  a  considerable 
economic  momentum  both to  the-Community  and  to its exter-
nal relations.  It had been,  indeed it was  a  dynamic 
stimulant for  the world's  economy".  This,  he  said,  was 
what  emerged  from  the  Community  experience;  it would  be-
come  increasingly manifest  as  the  Customs  Union dovetail-
ed  with full-scale  economic  integration,  as partisan 
viewpoints  waned  and  as  the  supranational institutions 
assumed  their full  stature.  It was  therefore  pertinent 
to  examine  European  economic  integ~ation in action,  leav-
ing aside  the hesitations and  contradictions that were 
part and  parcel  of its progress,  for it was  the  only  way 
whereby  Europe  could  achieve  a  decisive  position in terms 
of the  development  policy  of the world.  Europe  would  be 
faced  with integration in Latin America,  if barriers were 
gradually lowered  there  too,  if a  vast  economic  whole 
came  into being  and  if the  policies of the  various  coun-
tries were  co-ordinated;  for this would  enable Latin 
America  to  obviate  any undue  deployment  of its always 
limited resources  and  mean  their being used in the  most 
economic  way.  This would  make  it both easier to  assem-
ble  the  means  for  closer collaboration between Latin 
America  and  the  European Economic  Community  and  to 
achieve  this end  more  rapidly. 
In  re~ly to  a  second  question which  concerned  the  need  to 
abolish preferential tariffs between the  EEC  and  the  Afr-
ican States and  to  stabilize raw material prices between 
producer  and  cons11mer  States to  enable Latin America  to 
emerge  from its under-developed  phase,  Mr.  Colombo  said: 
"The  Customs Union is essential,  even  though it is not  of 
itself enough to  promote  economic itegration,  and  the 
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transition from national to  common  policies.  Without 
it,  the  various  economies,  which are not  always  comple-
mentary,  would  lack the  prerequisites for integration 
and  consolidation.  Although this Tariff has had  to in-
clude  certain exceptions  and  preferences  such as  those 
in favour  of the African States,  this is be·cause  there 
were,  between  them  and  certain EEC  States,  such tariffs 
originally.  Gradually,  however,  as  European  economic 
integration goes  forward  and  gathers momentum it will be 
easier,  indeed it will be  a  matter of necessity,  to  im-
prove  trade  with all the  other  economic  areas of the 
world."  ("Il Carriere della Sera",  22  and  24  April 
1966) 
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THE  PARLIAMENTS 
I. EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
Work  of the  Committees in April  1966 
External  Trade  Committee  (2) 
Meeting of  18  A~ril in Brussels:  Examination and  adoption 
of a  draft  Opin~on submitted by Mr.  Kriedemann  on  the 
establishment of a  common  price level for certain agri-
cultural products.  Representatives of the  EEC  Commission 
were  present. 
Examination of  the  report by-Mr.  Hahn  on  the  amended 
draft regulation  on  safeguards against dumping,  export 
subsidies or premiums  on  the part of non-Member  States 
and  on  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  this report. 
Representatives  of  the  EEC  Commission were  present. 
First examination of a  working paper by Mr.  Kapteyn  on 
the problem of stabilizing world  raw  material markets  and 
on  the relevant Opinions  submitted  by  the Agricultural 
Committee  and  the  Committee  for  Co~operation with  Devel-
oping Countries.  Representatives of the  EEC  Com.miss~o  ...... 
were  present. 
Discussion on  problems  connected with  the  conclusion of 
a  world  agreement  on  cereals.  Representatives of the  EEC 
Commission were  present. 
Agricultural Committee  (3) 
Meeting of  19  and  20 April in Brussels:  Examination  of a 
draft report by Mr.  Dupont  on  the  introduction of a  com-
mon.price level for milk and  dairy products, beef and 
veal,  rice,  sugar,  semi-oleaginous products and  olive oil. 
Exchange  of views with Mr.  Vredeling,  Rapporteur,  on  the 
draft regulation carrying forward  the  closing date  for 
EAGGF  assistance  appl-ications  (Guidance  Section)  during 
1965. 
\ 
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Meeting of  4  April in Brussels:  Adoption of  the  report 
by Mr.  Bersani  on  the draft EEC  Regulation  amending and 
amplifying Regulations  3  and  4  on  social security for 
migrant workers  (seamen). 
Adoption  of an additional draft report by Mr.  Vredeling 
following  the  amended  EEC  Commission proposals  on meas-
ures  on behalf of workers in the  Italian sulphur indus-
try. 
Examination  resumed  of  the  draft EEC  Commission  recom-
mendation  on  maternity benefits and  of  the  draft amend-
ments proposed  by  Miss~Lulling. 
Examination of  the  draft EEC  Commission  recommendation 
for a  Community  definition of  the  degree  of invalidity 
giving entitlement  to benefits.  ' 
Meeting of  13,  14  and  15  April in Turin:  Meeting with 
the  TUrin authorities and  exchange  of views with all the 
authorities  concerned  on  redevelopment problems arising 
from  the  crisis in  the  textile industry in Piedmont. 
Visits  to  industries in  the  area and  joint visit with 
the  Committee  for Co-operation with Developing Countries 
to  the  International  Technical  Training Centre  for  the 
~eveloping Countries. 
Adoption of  the  major part of  the  report by Mr.  P~tre on 
the  social aspects of redevelopment. 
Joint meeting with  the  Health Protection Committee  on 
26  April in Brussels:  Exchange  of views  w~th representa-
t~ves of the  soc~al partners and  insurance  organizations 
on  a  draft EEC  Commission  recommendation for  a  Community 
definition of  the  degree  of invalidity giving. entitlement 
to benefits.  Representatives of the  EEC  Commission  were 
present. 
Meeting of  20 April in Brussels:  Adoption of the rest 
of  the  report by Mr.  Ptitre  on  the  social aspects of re-
development. 
Examination of those.parts of  the  14th General  Report on 
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social policy.  (Rapporteur for the  Opinion:  Mr.  Hansen). 
Meeting of  26  Alril in Brussels:  Examination  resumed  of 
those parts of ~e 14th  General  Report  on  the  activities 
of the ECSC  High Authority  concerning social policy. 
Internal Market  Committee  (5) 
Meeting of  25  April in Brussels:  Examination of  the  draft 
report by Mr.  Berkbouwer of the  EEC  Commission  proposal 
on  company  law.  Representatives  of  the  EEC  Commission 
were present. Examination of and  vote  on  the  report by 
Mr.  Jarrot on  the  right of establishment and  the  freedom 
to  supply  services in non-wage  earning activities in 
forestry.  Representatives of the  EEC  Commission  were 
present. 
Examination of  those parts of  the  14th General  Report  on 
the activity of  the ECSC  High Authority  coming within 
the  terms  of reference of the  Committee,  and  drawing up  . 
of an  Opinion for the  Rapporteur General.  Representatives 
of the  ECSC  High Authority were  present. 
Economic  and  Financial  Committee  (6) 
Meeti~g of  18  Alril in Brussels: Examination  resumed  of 
the  dratt repor  by Mr.  Bersani  on  the first EEC  Commis-
sion report on  regional policy in the  Community. 
Meeting of  25  April in Brussels:  Adoption  of the draft 
report by Mr.  Bersan1  on  ihe first EEC  Commission  report 
on  regional policy in the  Community'~d examination and 
adoption of  the  draft resolution appended  to  the report. 
St~ement by Mr.  Gerlach  on  the  outcome  of the  Social 
Committee's discussions in Turin. Discussion with repre-
sentatives of  the  ECSC  High Authority  on  those parts of 
the  14th Report  on  the activity of  the  ECSC  coming with-
in the  terms of reference of the  Committee. 
\ 
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Deveiop~ng Countries  (7) 
Meeting of  15  A~ril in Turin:  Examination of  the  reP.ort 
by Mr.  van deroes van Naters  on  tourism in the Associ-
ated African and  Malagasy States;  representa-tives of the 
EEC  Commission  were  present. 
Meeting of 22  A~ril in Brussels:  Examination and  adoption 
of a  draft  Opin~on subm~tted by Mr.  Armengaud  on  a  work-
ing paper of  the External  Trade  Committee,  drafted by 
Mr.  Kapteyn,  on  the  problem of stabilizing the  world's 
raw  material markets,  seen in relation to  the  results of 
the  World  Trade  and  Development  Conference  of the  United 
Nations. 
Oral  report by Mr.  de  Lipkowski  on  an information visit 
to  four of  the  Associated African States:  Congo-Brazza-
ville, Cameroon,  the  Ivory Coast and  Gabon. 
Examination  of problems relating to  the next meeting of 
the  Joint EEC-AAMS  Committee  to  be  held in The  Hague  from 
24  to  27  May. 
Transport  Committee  (8) 
enoa:  ~scuss~on on  e  ra  repor  y  •  run es  on 
~ouncil's request 'or the European Parliament's Opin-
ion on  a  draft EEC  Commission  regulation on  the  abolition 
of discrimination over  transport prices and  conditions. 
Appointment of Mr.  Drouot L'Hermine  as Rapporteur for 
the  Opinion  (requested by  the  Council  from  the  European 
Parliament·)  on  a  draft EEC  Commission  d-irective  on  the 
approximation of  laws  on  trafficators.  Appoin~ment of 
Mr.  Seifriz as  Rapporteur  on  policy problems  co~oerning 
seaport traffic. Appointment of Mr.  de  Gryse  as Rappor-
teur on  the  amended  EEC  Commission proposal  to  the  Coun-
cil for a  regulation introducing a  tariff bracket system 
for  the  transport of  goods by road·,  rail and  navigable 
waterways. 
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Meeting of  1  April  in Brussels:  Examination  of  the  first 
draft of a  report for the  EEC  Commission's attention to 
the  Council  on  Community  policy  on  petroleum and  natural 
gas.  Subject  to  the  notification of  the  approval  applied 
for from  the Bureau,  examination of  the  EEC  Commission 
proposal  to  the  Council regulation giving a  common  defi-
nition of  the  term  "origin of goods"  and  the  establish-
ment  of a)  a  procedure  for issuing the  Opinion  and  b)  the 
appointment of  the  Rapporteur. 
First examination of the  parts of  the  14th High Authority 
Report  coming within  the  terms  of reference  of  the  Com-
mittee: 
a) First examination of  the  High Authority Report  on  the 
application of Decision No.  3/65; 
b) Examination  of  the  energy policy aspects  of  the  Gener-
al Objectives for Coal  and  exchange  of views  on  the 
short-term economic  situation in  the  energy  sector and 
on  the  information given  on  energy policy developments 
in the  individual Member  States. 
First examination of  the  final  version of the  Euratom 
Commission Programme  (Article  40  of  the  Treaty). 
Exchange  of views  on  the  work  involved in drawing up  a 
general European  energy policy. 
Discussion on  the  technical  and  procedural aspects  of  the 
arrangements  of meetings for  the  purposes of  study  and 
information. 
Research  and  Cultural Affairs Committee  (10) 
Meeting of  22  April  in Brussels:  Examination  and  approval 
of  the  draft report by Mr.  Scarascia Mugnozza  and  the 
draft resolution on  the  creation of a  European  Youth 
Council. 
\ 
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Meeting of  19  April in Brussels:  Discussion  on  those 
parts of the  14th  General  Report  on  the activities of 
the  ECSC  coming within  the  terms  of reference  of  the 
Committee.  Representatives of  the  High Authority were 
present. 
Adoption of the  draft Opinion  submitted by Mr.  Lenz,  to 
be  referred  to  the  Agricultural  Committee,  on  the  EEC 
Commission proposal  to  the  Council for a  directive  con-
cerning jams,  marmalades,  sweet-chestnut paste  and  fruit 
jellies. Representatives of the  EEC  Commission  were pres-
ent. 
Adoption of the  draft Opinion  submitted by Mr.  Angioy, 
to  be  referred  to  the Agricultural  Committee,  on  an  EEC 
Commission proposal  to  the  Council  for a  directive  on 
the  esterification of edible  olive oils. Representatives 
of  the  EEC  Commission were  present. 
Joint meeting with  the  Social  Committee  on  20 April in 
Brussels:  Discussion with  the  social partners and  insur-
ance  bodies  on  a  draft EEC  Commission  recommendation for 
a  Community  definition of  the  degree  of invalidity giving 
eligibility to benefits. Representatives of  the  EEC  Com-
mission were  present. 
Legal  Committee  (13) 
Meetin~ of  25  A~ril in Brussels:  Discussion  on  the  draft 
resolu  ~on  subm~tted by Mr.  Kreyssig  on behalf of  the 
Socialist Group  amending Article  5  of  the  Rules  of Pro-
cedure  of the  European Parliament  on  the  end  of  the  term 
of office of representatives.  Discussion on rationalizing 
the  work  of  the European Parliament. 
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Meeting of 21  A~ril in Brussels:  Examination of problems 
concerning theEC-Greece Association Treaty against  the 
background  of the  Third  Annual  Report  on  the  activity of 
the  Association Council  to  be  discussed  at the  next meet-
ing of the  Joint EEC-Greece  Parliamentary Committee. 
Appointment  of Mr.  Berthoin as first Deputy  Chairman  and 
Mr.  LUcker as  second  Deputy  Chairman of the  delegation to 
the  Joint EEC-Greece  Parliamentary Committee. 
Discussion on  the First Annual  Report of  the  EEC-Turkey 
Association Council. 
Joint EEC-Greece  Parliamentary Committee 
Meeting of 26-27 April in Rhodes:  Report by Mr.  Tsoudero~ 
Chairman-in-Office  of the  Association Council,  in his 
capacity as  deputy  Greek Minister for  co-ordination on 
difficult association  problems  from  the  Greek  Government 
standpoint. 
Submission of the  Third  Annual  Report  on  the  activity of 
the  Association Council  and  debate  opened  by Mr.  Scaras-
cia Mugnozza,  and  Mr.  Hassipides,  Rapporteurs.  Discussion 
on  the  Third  Annual  Report  on  the  activity of the  Associ-
ation Council  and  exchange  of views  on  the  various prob-
lems arising in connexion with  the  Association,  with par-
ticular reference  to  the  problems raised at the  Naples 
Conference. 
Adoption  of a  final  communique. 
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a) Belgium 
1.  Statement by  the  Belgian  Government  to  the  Senate  and 
to  the  Chamber  of Deputies 
Mr.  Vanden  Boeynants, Belgian Prime Minister,  in a  state-
ment  to  the  Chamber  of Representatives,  outlined  the  new 
Government's  aims;  among  these Belgium's Atlantic  and 
European Alliances  took pride of place.  He  said inter 
alia:  "While being citizens of  this  country  we  are  also 
citizens of the  world. It goes without saying that  the 
Government will honour its international obligations in 
full.  In any  event our  course is already  charted.  This 
is not subject  to  change.  This  means  standing by our 
European  and  Atlantic Alliances  and  involves: 
a)  close  co-operation within Benelux; 
b)  the political and  economic  unification of Europe  and 
opening  the  doors  of the  Community  to  other countries 
that accept its principles; 
c) fidelity  to  the  North Atlantic  Treaty Organization and 
to  the  subsequent  agreements; 
d)  a  policy of co-operation, at once  generous  and  realis-
tic with  the  developing countries. 
To  work within  the  Atlantic Alliance  to  establish a  cli-
mate  of world  peace,  to  construct a  strong and  united 
Europe,  to  co-operate with the  younger states,  to  wipe 
out  famine  and  poverty from  the  world,  these  are  the 
tasks  ahead  of us!"  (Proceedings in the  Senate  and  Cham-
ber of  Representatives,  23  March  1966) 
2.  The  Belgian  Senate  gives its approval  to  the  merger 
Treaty 
On  24 March  1966,  Mr.  Moreau  de  Melen,  acting for the 
Foreign Affairs Committee,  submitted  a  report  on  the 
Treaty instituting a  single  Council  and  a  single  Commis-
\ 
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Brussels on  8  April  1965. 
Before  going into  the  details of  the  Treaty,  he  had  a 
few  observations  to  make  on  the  way  this question affect-
ed  the  Senate.  Indeed  when  the  merger  Treaty was  submit-
ted  to  the  Chamber  of Representatives  on  26  to  27  Janu-
ary,  there  was  still some  uncertainty as  to  what  the  out-
come  to  the  Luxembourg negotiations would  be,  as  a  result 
of which  a  number  of representatives abstained  on  the 
grounds  t~at  it was  preferable  to  defer voting  on  this 
issue until  the  situation became  clearer.  Now  the  Six 
had  come  together again on  the  Council,  the budgetary 
proc.edure  had  been  resumed  and  discussion on  the  out-
standing problems  had  recommenced.  The  Rapporteur re-
capitulated  the  six ministers'  statement on  the  working 
schedule  concerning ratification:  "They have  agreed  on 
the  date  by which  the  instruments of ratification shall 
be  deposed  during the  first half of  1966,  subject  to  the 
requisite parliamentary ratifications being obtained  and 
agreement being reached  on  the  composition and  on  the 
President and  Vice-President of  the  Commission."  He  add-
ed:  "Your Committee  does not wish  to  make  approval  of 
the  Treaty dependent  on  who  shall be  appointed  or re-
appointed  on  the  single  Commission.  That is a  matter for 
the  Governments." 
The  Rapporteur  then  spoke  in favour of  approving  the 
Treaty.  He  analyzed its provisidns,  comparing  them  with 
those  of  the  Treaty  of Rome.  Although merging  the  Coun-
cils raised  few  problems,  the  creation of  the  single 
Commission  raised  quite  a  number because  of  the  differ-
ences between  the  provisions  concerning the  three bodies 
that it was  to  replace.  After a  point by point  examin-
ation of the  merger  Treaty,  however,  the  Rapporteur  con-
cluded  that no  major  change  in the  Treaties of  Rome  and 
Paris had  been made. 
In  submitting his report  to  the  Senate  on  5 April  he 
stated, inter alia:  "The  Treaty does  no  more  than  create 
a  single  Council  to  replace  the  three  existing Councils 
and  to provide  that it shall exercise  the  powers laid 
down  in the  treaties. It does not however modify  the 
powers vested  in  these bodies by  the  treaties.  Thus  the 
single  Commission will exercise  the  powers  of  the  ECSC 
according  to  ECSC  rules."  He  reviewed  the  main  provisions 
of the  new.  Treaty  and  concluded:  "I believe  that we  have 
no  longer any ·grounds  of national  susceptibility for not 
agreeing to  this Treaty.  I  therefore ask the  Senate  to 
pass  this bill, particularly  ~ince it involves  a  central-
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I ization and  rationalization of international institu-
tions." 
During the  debate Mr.  Ballet spoke  of his  concern about 
France's attitude:  "France  does not want  any  form  of 
supranational integration.  She  wants multilateral agree-
ments.  The  situation needs watching carefully  so  that 
she  does not become  the  Trojan horse in the  merged  Com-
munities  and  takes  advantage  of her presence  or absence 
to  undermine  this organization in order to  make  it cul-
minate  in a  Europe  of Nation-States which  would  in fact 
be  a  Europe  of  States."  The  speaker was  concerned  at the 
divergencies in  the  views  expressed  by  the  Belgian  and 
Dutch foreign ministers but  he  concluded  by approving 
the  merger bill. 
Mr.  van Eslande, Minister for Dutch  Culture  and  European 
Affairs,  stated:  "The Belgian  Government will exert every 
effort to  expedite  the merger."  In reply  to  the  concern 
expressed  by Mr.  Ballet he  said:  "I stress that  this bill 
must  serve  the  creation of an integrated Europe,  to  the 
exclusion of any  other formula." 
The  bill approving  the  Treaty· was  passed  by  101.votes  to 
1 with Mr.  de  la Vallee Poussin abstaining,  because  al-
though he  agreed  with  the  High Authority being merged 
with  the  other  two  Commissions,  he  feared  that  the  High 
Authority's administrative  independence  might be  cur-
tailed  as  a  result of  the  new  budgetary provisions  and 
that the  influence of the  finance  ministers,  whose  views 
were  often unduly  one-sided,  might  impair  the  sound  or-
ganization of the  services. 
On  27  April Mr.  Harmel,  Foreign Minister,  stated in the 
Chamber  of Deputies:  "The  Belgian Government will not 
submit its instruments of ratification on  the  Treaty 
merging the  executives of  the  Communities until  the  rules 
governing  the  operation and  the new  single European  Com-
mission have  been  jointly agreed."  (Senate Proceedings, 
5  April  1966  and  Doc.  126/1965-66) 
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Euroie  - a  recurrent  theme  in a  general debate  held  in 
therench Nat~onal Assembly 
Although  the  French National Assembly began its session 
at the beginning of April, it was  not really  "back"  un-
til 13  April  when  a  general  debate  was  held  following  a 
government  statement. 
This  statement,  made  by  the  Prime Minister,  began with 
references  to  constitutional  theories,  went  on  to  discuss 
economic  and  financial policy - whose  keynotes  were 
stable prices  and  a  steady currency- and  then,  with  a 
recapitulation of French ideas,  dealt with foreign  policy 
problems:  "In Western Europe,  what  France  wants is to 
complete  the  Common  Market and,  in due  course,  to  open 
its doors  to  neighbouring States- such as  the  United 
Kingdom- that are  ready  to  accept all that it involves. 
France  also  wants  to  see  genuine  co-operation between 
these  countries,  now  that the  Franco-German reconcili-
ation has  removed  the  main  cause  of former  conflicts,  so 
that they  may  slowly but  surely reach  the  stage  where 
their policies interlock; if this is done  Europe  may  at 
long last recover its rightful place in the  world,  the 
place  to  which its population,  it~ economic  strength and 
its potential in every  sphere  entitle it." While  main-
taining good  relations both with  the East European  coun-
tries and  with  the  United  States of America he  added: 
"France  claims  the  right  to  her  own  policy,  the  right to 
define her  own  identity." 
He  then  discussed  developments  since  the previous parlia-
mentary  session,  the  most  striking of which,  he  felt, 
were:  plans  for  General  de  Gaulle's visit to  the  USSR, 
the  NATO  crisis and  the  resumption  of negotiations in 
Brussels,  about which he  stated~ /"Although still adamant 
with regard  to  the  structures of Europe,  the  respective 
competence  of  the  Council of Ministers and  of  the  Com-
mission and  adamant  that none  of the  countries involved 
should  have  to  bow  before  decisions  that clash with its 
es~ential interests,  France is none  the less determined 
to  finalize  the  Common  Market in its entirety,  in its 
agricultural  and  in its industrial aspects.  Indeed, 
France's aim is the  introduction of a  genuine  economic 
policy,  for which provision was  made  in  the  Treaty of 
Rou.Le  but which has hardly begun  to  get off the  ground." 
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enclosed,  sheltering behind  the  common  customs  tariff; 
she is ready  to facilitate progress at the Kennedy  Round 
and  by cutting tariffs across  the board,  to further  the 
expansion of international trade  as·  a  result of which  she 
expects closer links between  the  countries involved  and 
all-round  economic  expansion,  especially in France. 
In our view,  however,  all will depend  on  setting up  the 
common  agricultural market  and  hence  on finalizing the 
regulation on  financing agriculture.  I  am  delighted  that 
,  the  most recent  talks in Brussels justify a  cautious but 
reasonable  optimism about  the  future  in every  sphere." 
The  ensuing debate  was  almost entirely on  the  NATO  crisis 
but it did  give  members  an  opportunity  to  state  their 
views  on European problems. Mr.  Pierre Abelln  (centre 
democratique)  took  the  Government  to  task for not inform-
ing the  electorate,  as of  1962,  of its intention  to  pur-
sue  "an essentially nationalistic,  and  even isolationist, 
line"  and  for not making  clear that "it rejected  the idea 
of constructing the  political Europe  by  stages  except 
within  the  ambit of periodic meetings of the  foreign 
ministers."  Had  these attitudes been  clearly stated,  the 
Centre  and  the  Centre-Left  "would  have  come  out far more 
emphatically  than  they did  in support of a  different at-
titude  aiming at building a  political Europe  that would 
have  common  defence  and 'external relations policies;  ••• 
they would  have  made  known  their determination  to  draw 
up  basic planning measures- in co-operation with  the 
United Kingdom- for the Europe  of the  Treaty of  Rome. 
There  would  not  then have  been  any  confusion in  the  pub-
lic mind  between  this potential majority  and  an  opposi-
tion rating as  too  negative in its approach." 
Mr.  Rene  Sanson  (UNR-UDT),  on  the  other hand,  came  out in 
support of  the  gaullist line  on  integration:  "Europe, 
like France,  must  defend its independence,  politically 
in  the East but economically in  the  West.  This is why 
Europe must be united; but it must be  independent in 
every  sense.  In the  years  ahead  when,  within a  Europe 
that comprises not only  the  Six but which  stretches  to 
the  geographic limits of  our  continent,  investments  are 
co-ordinated  and  - for this will be  necessary - when  work 
is divided,  when  Europe is at last able  to  face  up  to  the 
American  giant and  the  danger of Europe's losing its 
identity has been  removed,  then  and  only  then will it be 
possible for us  to  think in terms of an Atlantic Europe. 
And  this will not  prevent  our remaining within  the Atlan-
tic Alliance.  Quite  on  the  ·contrary." 
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\ "The  French  Government's decision",  he  concluded,  "ought 
to  be  seen as  a  challenge  to  Europeans  to  resume  command 
of their fortunes.  This  stems not from  any  outworn nati.cn-
alism but from  a  kind  of cautious,  constructive  and  for-
ward-looking Europeanism." 
Mr.  Raymond  Mendon  (Republicain independant)  tackled 
European problems more  s~uarely, stressing France's rOle 
in the  Common  Market:  "Fortunately,  the  Luxembourg negot-
iations were  a  success and  it did not prove necessary  to 
revise  the  Treaty;  due  regard  was  had  for France's in-
tention, nay,  her  determination  on  the  issue  of  majority-
voting at meetings  of the  Council of Ministers.  The  ~alks 
held in Brussels recently and  the  initiatives taken by 
France  have  furthermore  led  to  what  the  French press has 
termed  a  full-scale  re-launching of  the  Common  Market  and 
to  the  resumption of negotiations at  the  Kennedy  Round. 
This  gives  the lie  to  the  ~uite gratuitous  comments  made 
in some  ~uarters and  proves  that France  does not wish  to 
withdraw into her shell. One  might  ~dd that without 
France's  economic  and  financial  recovery of  1958-59,  a 
recovery  cemented  and  carried for by  the  stabilization 
plan,  the  Common  Ma~ket could not have  gone  forward  in 
the  same  way."  He  then  turned  to  the  agricultural negoti-
ations:  "French agriculture, whose  difficulties are  fa-
miliar to  us,  had  welcomed  the results obtained. But  the 
discussions are still in progress.  France  must  keep  up 
her efforts  to  ensure  that the  financing regulation is 
finalized in May." 
A few  days later,  the National  Assembly  debated  a  censure 
motion  tabled  by  members  attacking the  Government's  NATO 
policy, with both Mr.  Guy  Mollet and  Mr.  Maurice  Faure 
taking their stand  against  the  Government's attitude  to 
Europe. 
The  Secretary-General df  the  SFIO  said:  "To  destroy At-
lantic policy by making it impossible  to  construct Eur-
ope  has  serious implications.  The  idea  tia.at  "a man's 
house  is his castle" is a  very attractive one;  it might 
even be- fashionable.  But  how  will it go  down  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Rhine?  If it is felt there may  be  no  conflict 
oetween a  renascence  of nationalism, political interest 
and  economic  interest and  substantial easing of  tension 
betwe~n the  USA  and  the  USSR,  future  generations may 
still rue  the  day in  1965  when  Europe  was built without 
France."  Mr. Mollet  concluded:  "I criticize the  Gaullist 
Government  for the  empty-chair policy it has  taken in all 
those  organizations where  an attempt is being made  to 
organize  disarmament or at least to bring it under  con-
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I trol." 
For his part Mr.  Maurice  Faure  (Rassemblement  democra-
tique) stated:  "It is quite  clear that when  Europe  be-
comes  a  major power,  with a  population of 150  to  200 mil-
lion people, it will have better things  to  do  than  to 
rush in  to  the  va.ssaldom of  the  USA;  it would  however pre-
serve  the  alliance  and it is to  be  regretted  that  the 
funds  that the  French Government  is currently appropriat-
ing may  begin by putting France  out  of  the European unity 
running and  end  up  by undermining a  hope  of real magni-
tude." 
Addressing the  Government in the  person of Mr.  Pompidou, 
he  added:  "What  I  criticize  you  for is for destroying one 
form  of balance before establishing another form  of bal-
ance  to  take its place or at least before  knowing  towards 
what  form  of balance  our efforts might  be  directed." 
(Debates in the  National Assembly,  13-14 April  1966; 
Combat,  20 April  1966) 
c)  Germany 
Bundestag debate  on agriculture 
On  2  March  1966  the Bundestag debated  the  "Green  Report" 
submitted  by  the  German  Government  on  the agricultural 
situation.  The  focal point of  the  debate  was  the  proposal 
that when  matters of vital interest to  German  farmers 
were  raised at the  EEC  negotiations in Brussels no  fur-
ther concessions  should  be  made.  The  Representatives  of 
the  Government Parties drew  attention to  the  critical 
state of German  finances. which  set a  limit on  further. 
charges accruing  through increased  equalization payments. 
Every  concession in terms  of  German  price levels auto-
matically led  to  increased  demands  on  the part of  the 
farmers  as had  been  the  case with cereal prices. 
Mr.  Bauknecht  (CDU),  Chairman  of  the  Food  Committee,  took 
a  similar line in stressing that German  farmers  would  be 
justified in asking for  compensation for loss of income 
if, in the interests of European integration,  agricultur~ 
al prices were  reduced at their  expense •.  Reasonable  de-
cisions had  to  be  taken in Bonn  and  in Brussels  that in-
volved  no  prejudice  to  agriculture.  He  criticized  the 
- 57  -German  Government  for failing to  take  full  advantage  of 
the possibility under EEC  Regulations of paying  agricul~ 
tural export rebates.  He  did not  think that agricultural 
products  should  be  held  responsible  for the increase in 
the  cost of living. In view  of  the  increased  cost of 
middlemen's  services,  the  gap  between production  and  con-
sumer prices were  increasing all the  time.  The  cause  of 
this  trend  could  be  ascribed  to  the  increases in wages 
and  social service  charges  of recent years,  for these  had 
far-reaching implications in relation  to  increased  pro-
ductivity. As  for  the  proposals made  in the  Green Plan, 
Mr.  Bauknecht deplored  the  cut in credit facilities and 
the  anticipated withdrawal  of reduced  rates of interest 
on  old  debts. It was  urgently necessary that the  funds 
available  for reduced  rates of interest be  raised  to 
something like  the  former  high level. His party would  take 
the necessary action  to  this end. 
Mr.  Bewerunge  (CDU)  observed  that expert opinion was 
clear that agriculture has made  a  major  contribution to 
stability. He  rejected  the  id-ea  of  "freezing"  German  ag-
ricultural production for  this would  depri-ve  the  farmer 
of  the  opportunity of increasing productivity in relation 
to  manpower  and  to  area cultivated. 
Dr.  Schmidt  (SPD)  called  upon  the  Government  to  work out 
a  medium-term  programme  for  the  improvement  of agricul-
tural structures  taking into account  the  proposals of  the 
relevant advisory  council and  anticipated  structural de-
velopments in the  EEC.  Since.  in the  foreseeable  future, 
major  structural policy powers would  be  transferred  to 
the  EEC,  the  German  Government  had  to  make  the necessary 
adjustments.  The  SPD  spokesman  drew  attention to  increas-
ing disparity among  farmers  referred  to in the  Green  Re-
port and  demanded  that the necessary series of measures, 
which  the  SPD  Group  had  proposed  - describing them as 
"Social Funds  to  improve  Agricultural  Structures"  - be 
taken  to  deal with this disparity.·Dr.  Schmidt asked  the 
Government  to  develop its ideas  on  fUture  policy for milL 
It had  to  make  clear: 
a)  how  it envisaged  the  cut in subsidies collectively de-
cided in Brussels; 
b)  how  it proposed  to  change  the  value  relationship be-
tween  the fat and  non-fat  content,  and 
c)  how  it proposed  to  prevent any increase in butter pro-
duction. 
Dr. Effertz  (FDP)  said, in submitting his Party•s draft 
resolution,  that the  Government  was  endeavouring to  defer 
- 58  -the  introduction of the  common  price for cereals,  planned 
for  1  July  1967,  until  the  still outstanding  a~ricultural 
decisions had  been  taken in Brussels.  The  FDP  {Free  Demo-
cratic Party) felt that the Minister was  justified in ar-
guing in Brussels  that it was  not  enough  to  take  percent-
age  calculations into  account but  that one  had  also  to 
consider  the-volume  of production as  had  been  the  case 
for  the  financing of agriculture.  To  do  this,  guide  pri-
ces  had  to  be  set and  the  frejght  charges for agricul-
tural nroducts  had  to  be  harmonized.  It was  also  impor-
tant  to  know  whether  the  partners were  ready  to  recognize 
the  "gross"  p.rinciple with reference  to  imports  and  ex-
ports or whether  they wished  to  stick to  the  "net"  prin-
ciple. 
Mr.  Hocherl,  Minister for Agriculture,  dealt with  the 
structure of German  agriculture, its development  and  the 
European agricultural policy. Its basis,  he  stressed,  was 
a  major decision  taken  by  the  Six of  their own  free will 
to  create  a  European  Community  and  to  transfer to it 
sovereign rights.  Thus  there  should  be  no  talk in the 
Bundestag of  li~uidating the  national farming policy. It 
had  been  agreed  in Brussels at  the  recent negotiations -
with an  eye  to  the  Kennedy  Round  in Geneva- that as  from 
1  July  1967  there  should  be  free  trade  not  only in indus-
trial but also  in agricultural products. It had  been  ask-
ed  what  further market regulations  and  single prices still 
had  to  be  introduced  to  meet  this deadline.  He  stressed 
that  the  German  delegation had  not  failed  to  point out 
that the  reduction in cereal prices was  not an  isolated 
event; it had  to  be  coupled  with progress in respect of 
other products  that affected  the  interests of  Germany's 
partners,  such as fats,  fruit,  vegetables and  other agri-
cultural products. 
In  a  resolution  tabled  by  the  Government Parties,  the 
principles for  the  Brussels negotiations  on  the  common 
agricultural policy were  set forth;  (in view  of their ma-
jority position,  this amounted  to  a  vote  in the Bundes-
tag). 
1.  The  Government  should  make  no  concession  that might 
lead  to  any  further loss of  income  for  the  German  far-
mers. 
2.  The  entry into  force  of  the  cereal price approximation 
on  1  July  1967  predicated  that agreement  should  first 
be  reached  on  the  outstanding market regulations and 
price  approximations.  The  relationship between bread 
and  fodder  cereals had  to  be  adjusted. 
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\ 3.  The  dairy produce  prices .in  the  EEC  should  be  set on 
the basis of  39  pfennig per kg for  3.7 %  milk  content 
at production.  If this price were  not fetched  at the 
market,  milk subsidies had  to  be  maintained  and  sub-
se~uently paid  for from  the  EAGGF. 
4.  The  Guidance  Price  for beef and  veal had  to  be  put up 
in  1966  in order  to  guarantee  ade~uate supplies. 
5.  In  the  market regulation for  sugar it had  to  be  en-
sured,  through  regional production  targets,  that Ger-
man  sugar-beet cultivation could  be  maintained. 
6. With regard  to  fruit and  vegetables  the  market pro-
visions had  to  be  improved;  if need  be,  an  attempt had 
to be  made  to  introduce regulations  for  specialized 
crops like hops  and  tobacco. 
7.  The  market  regulation for vegetable  fats  should  ensure 
that the production of oil-yielding fruits in Germany 
remained  constant. 
8.  A precondition for  agreem~nt on  financing agriculture 
should  be  the  recognition of  the  "gross"  principle for 
the  payment  of export drawbacks  from  the EAGGF.  Only 
this would  enable  German  farmers  and  food  producers, 
especially in places at some  distance  from markets, to 
adjust  to  trade  trends  and  find  new  markets.  ( ••Eandela-
blatt'',  3  March  1966;  Bundestag,  5th election perJ.od, 
24th session,  Bonn,  2 March  1966) 
d)  Netherlands 
1. Preparatory work- procedure  concerning  the  ratifi-
cation of  the  merger  Treaty 
An  interim report  (1) was  entered  by  the  Foreign Affairs 
Budget  Committee  on  the bill ratifying the  merger  Treaty. 
In reply  the  Dutch  Government  produced  a  memorandum  in 
which it stated  that the bill was  purely and  simply  an 
act of ratification and  did  not involve  a  constitutional 
adoption.  The  Government,  however,  was  aware  of its res-
ponslbilities and  had  made  the  deposition of the ratifi-
cation instruments  subject (in the  event of  the  Treaty's 
not  coming into force)  to  certain conditions. 
(1)  See  "European Documentation"· No.3, page  63 
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I Theoretically,  the  Crown  had  the  right and  the  option to 
ratify as  the Parliament had  approved  the  Treaty,  but was 
not bound  to  do  so.  "If it were  possible  for  the  Second 
Chamber  to bind  the  Government by  a  mandate, it would  no 
longer be  able  to  flex its foreign policy  to  the  needs 
of  the international situation at will.  Indeed, it would 
be  delegating the  conduct of foreign policy to  the  Second 
Chamber." 
The  States General  could  legally refuse  to  approve  a 
treaty.  Similarly, political practice would  allow  them 
to  reserve  judgment  about an adoption proposal.  "If the 
Chamber  tabled  a  motion requiring the  Government  to  in-
form  the  Chamber  of its intention to  ratify the  Treaty 
in order  to  debate its desirability,  the  motion would 
have  to be  examined  in the  light of what has already been 
stated about  the  limits to which it is possible  to  go  in 
relations between  the  Government  and  the  States General." 
The  Dutch Government  of course  was  ready  to  state that 
it would  not  dismiss  such a  motion  a  priori and  that it 
would  no·t  oppose  a  debate  in  the  Second  Chamber  on  the 
desirability of deposing the  ratification instruments. 
The  Government  could not,  however,  state in advance  that 
the  opinion of  the  Second  Chamber  or that of  the  F-irst 
Chamber,  whether  it,were  the  same  or not,  would  be  the 
only factors  that it would  bear in mind  in defining its 
policy. 
The  Ministers responsible wanted  to  examine  the  adoption 
decree at once  in  so  far as  the  Chamber  considered  this 
necessary,  not ruling out  the possibility of a  mor~ de-
tailed discussion with  the  Foreign Affairs Budget Com-
mittee before  the  act of ratification were  deposed.  They 
wanted  to  do  this for the·following reasons:  the  timing 
of  the  ratification was  primarily a  matter for  the Foreign 
Office;  the Ministers responsible also wanted  to  discuss 
the bill with  the  First Chamber  in good  time  to  allow  for 
an  unhurried  and  detailed  examination  and  for both oral 
and  written interventions.  To  postpone  such a  discussion 
would  make  it impossible  to  finalize  t~c ratification by 
the  date  stipulated by  the European  Communities  and  would 
mean  postponing this until a  few  weeks  afterwards,  pro-
viding all went well.  The  Ministers were  also in favour 
of  co-ordinating their adoption with that of  the  other 
Benelux Parliaments. 
Although  the  situation in the  Community  was,  in the  opin-
ion of the  responsible Ministers,  more  or less back  to 
1ormal,  they  had  to bear in mind  the  disagreements betMEn 
the  six Governments  on points of principle,  especially 
- 61  -concerning the prerogatives and  the  status of  the Execu-
tive  Commission.  The  ratification instruments would  not 
therefore be  deposed until  the  Governments  had  come  to 
some  satisfactory arrangement  on  this subject. 
In·February  1964,  the  Dutch representative  on  the  Council 
proposed  that if the  whole  Commission  resigned,  the  sub-
sequent appointments  to  the  Commission  by  the  Governments 
should  be  subject  to  the  approval  of the European Parlia-
ment- this with reference  to  the  European Parliament's 
·having a  say in  the  appointment of members  in the  single 
Commission.  The  proposal had  met with very little res-
ponse.  The  Dutch  Government was  reluctant to  make  further 
proposals and  had  suggested  talks with  the President of 
the Parliament and  with  the  Chairmen  of the Parliament's 
Political Groups.  For its part the  Dutch Government  would 
like  to  hear  the  views  of  the  European Parliament as  a 
whole  on  the  composition of the  new  Commission.  (1965-66 
Session- 8380  (R  506)) 
Increasing the  influence of the  European Parliament 
The  Dutch Government  expects  that  the  influence  of  the 
European Parliament will be  enhanced  when  the  merger  goes 
through.  The  responsibilities of  the  present Executives 
are  shared within  certain important areas  (competition 
policy,  energy policy,  etc.),  a  div~sion which will  end 
with the merger,  making it easier for  the Parliament  to 
exercize its supervisory duties. 
It was  evident after the  talks on  strengthening the  pow-
ers of the  Parliament  that  the  Council  held  on  24  and  25 
February  1964,  that  there  had  been  an  improvement  in re-
lations between  the  two  especially on  consultation about 
association agreements  and  Council  members  taking part in 
parliamentary discussions.  There  had,  however,  been no 
pro-gress at all towards  solving the  problem of increasing 
the Parliament's budgetary powers,  which  remained  bound 
up  with  the  creation of  independent  Community  revenues. 
The  Parliament  could  no  doubt bring greater influence  to 
bear when  the  budget was  drawn  up  if instead of advancing 
and  o~inion in general  terms, it put a  genuine  plan before 
the  Council articulating the  amendments it wished  to  pro-
pose.  Under Article  203,4 of the  Treaty of Rome  the  Coun-
cil would  then have  to  discuss with  the  Commission  the 
draft budget  so  amended.  The  Dutch  Government  felt that 
obviously  any  vote  that proved necessary before  the  bud-
get were  finally adopted,  would  also  concern  the  draft 
- 62  -budget  so  amended.  At  present  the practice is for the 
Council  to  draw  up  the  draft budget  on  the basis of  the 
preliminary draft drawn  up before  the  European Parliament 
has been  consulted,  the  latter's opinion  simply figuring 
in an  appendix.  (Memorandum  submitted  by  the Dutch  Gov-
ernment in reply  to  the  Interim Report  on  the  merger of 
the Executives.  1965-66  Session- 8380  (R  506) 
the  im  lications of the  common  a  icul-
In  the  Memorandum  written in reply  to  the relevant report 
on  Chapter XIV  of the  finance bill for  1966  (appropri-
ations for  the Ministry of Agriculture  and  Fisheries), 
Mr.  Biesheuvel  stated  that despite  deep-seated political 
differences, it had  been possible  to  ward  off the  danger 
of economic  confusion.  Indeed,  all  the Member  States in-
cluding Franc.e  had  shown  themselves  ready  to  co-operate 
during what  had  been  a  "closed  season"  in taking measures 
to  guarantee  the  continuity of the  common  policy  and  this 
had  precluded  any  large-scale disintegration. 
Manpower  and  productivity in agriculture 
The  substantial boost in Dutch agricultural productivity 
had  been  coupled  with  an exodus  of farm workers.  On  aver-
age,  productivity had  increased  by  more  than  60 per cent 
because  of  the  reductions in labour force  and  by nearly 
40  per cent because  of  the net increase in output.  The 
ratio between area  cultivated  and  per capita capital in-
vested  on  the  farms  each year ran  closely parallel  to  the 
net productivity figure  which meant  that the  reason  for 
increased  farm  outputs lay more  in  the  increased  per cap-
ita annual investment  than in  the  reduction of  the  active 
agricultural population. Productivity  could  only be  in-
creased if the  use  of increased  means  of production were 
~oupled with room  being made  by  those  who  leave  farming, 
ao  that agricultural manpower  trends were  a  precondition 
rather  than  a  cause  of increased  productivity. 
~etween 1950  and  1965  there was  a  reduction of about  40 
>er  cent in  the  men  working  on  the  land; it was  unlikely 
;hat this fall-out rate would  be  kept up  in the  next fif-
;een  years,  because  of the increasing number  of heads  of 
tnterprises leaving farming. 
- 63  -The  non-protectionist nature  of the  EEC 
Since  certain countries began practising agricultural 
protectionism in the  thirties,  the  world market in many 
farm products has  been  such that even slight surpluses 
or  shortages have  produced fairly appreciable  price fluc-
tuations.  This is one  of the  most  decisive  arguments in 
support  of international  co-operation. 
Co-operation at  a  regional level  along EEC  lines would 
not involve  any  special difficulties for third countries 
unless  the  common  production level  exceeded  the  average 
national level in any  of the  six countries.  There is no 
indication that this level has  been exceeded,  nor have 
trade  trends moved  in this direction.  Farm product  im-
~orts into  the  EEC  rose  from  S7,356,000m in 1958  to 
$10,149,000m in  1964  (over  37  per cent in six years). 
Over  the  same  period  intra-Community  trade in farm pro-
ducts  rose  by  130  per cent  an~ is equally no  grounds  for 
suggesting that  the  EEC  is protectionist. Naturally when 
all the  customs barriers between  the  Member  States are 
removed,  this is bound  to boost  trade between  them  and 
this would  happen  even if the  external protection of the 
Community were  lowered  still further. 
What  is true is that  a  few  countries  can hamper  the  ex-
pansion of international trade  by  ~dopting a nationalis-
tic approach;  this is also  true  of the  Community  approach 
in the  field of agricultural policy although it is so  to 
a  lesser degree.  This is why  the  Dutch  Government  was  in 
favour  of the  EEC's  taking part in the Kennedy  Round  and 
endorsed  the  attitude  so  far  adopted  by  the  Community 
that the level  of production should be  consolidated  and 
that as far  as possible  agreements  should  be  concluded 
on  the  major products. 
The  steady rise in living standards in the  EEC  has helped 
the  exports of  the  developing countries in respect of 
commodities not produced  in the  temperate  zone  of the 
EEC.  Adequate  provision must be  made  for  the  farmer in 
the  EEC  when  international agreements  are  concluded but 
with this proviso, that the  objection entered by  the  de-
veloEing countries  that export products  competitive with 
those  of the  EEC  should  be  taken into account. 
To  that end  the  Community  has abolished  customs duties on 
nine  of th&  tropical products exported by  the  Associated 
African States; it has also  cut duties  on  these  products 
by  15  to  40  per cent and  even  suspended  them  completely 
- 64  -where  they have  been  exported  by non-associated  develop-
ing countries. By  agreement with  the United Kingdom,  fur-
thermore,  export duties have  for the  time  being been  sus-
pended  completely  on  tea,  mate  and~tropical woods.  The 
common  customs  tariff has also beeh  either wholly  or 
partly removed  for  a  whole  series of  other products  of 
interest to  the  developing  countries. 
Natio~al agricultural policy 
The  Minister for Agriculture  did not agree  that  the na-
tional agriculturalpolicy would  become  primarily  techni-
cal  and  limited in scope.  Even if co-operation were  taken 
quite  a  long way,  this would  still leave  room  for  the 
execution of major  economic,  social  and  structural  t~sks 
at the national discretion.  Hence,  although the  responsi-
bilities and  duties of  the Minister of Agriculture  and 
Fisheries would  lie in a  different direction,  they  would 
not be  reduced  but consist in fitting national policy in-
to  a  much  larger framework  and  in intervening to  an  ever-
increasing extent within this enlarged  framework. 
Competitive  anomalies  in the  EEC 
The  EEC  Commission  was  expected  to  put proposals  on  ap-
proximating competitive  conditions  to  the  Council in  the 
near future.  The  Minister for Agriculture  therefore felt 
that it would  be  unadvisable at this  stage  to  make  any 
change  in the national  selective assistance policy.  There 
were  still quite  appreciable differences  especially over 
taxes  to  which  the  EEC  would  have  to  pay special atten-
tion, particularly in view  of their effect on agricul-
ture. 
The  EEC  - no  bar to  exports  to  third  countries 
Relatively,  Dutch agricultural exports  to  third  countries 
have  increased  in absolute  terms,  to wit by  9.2 per cent 
from  1963  to  1964.  The  relative  and  absolute increase in 
intra-Community  trade,  however,  has been  one  of the  most 
fortunate results of the  economic  union.  The  EEC  Commis-
sion did not regard  trade with  third  countries as  a  sec-
ondary  consideration.  On  the  contrary,  the agricultural 
regulations,  especially  the  drawback  clauses,  reflected 
- 65  -an  awareness  that it was both necessary and  desirable for 
the Member  States  to  trade with  third  countries. 
Legal differences hampering exports  to  the  EEC  countries 
The  differences between  the  laws  Jf  the Member  States in 
many  spheres  continue  to  hamper  exports  to  the  EEC  coun-
tries.  The  policy .end  in view  was  to  eliminate  these dis-
parities to  create  a  genuine  common  market for all pro-
ducts  regardless of origin.  Some  regulations had  been 
carried  through but progress was  slow  and  laborious. 
Subsidies and  levies 
There  had  been no  evidence  to  date  to  challenge  the 
soundness of the Brussels  theory  that production prices 
should  be  arrived at through  the  agency of domestic mar-
ket prices. This  problem will not be  solved  once  and  for 
all until prices have  been set for  the major agricultur-
al products.  A formula  has already been agreed  on for  two 
products - durum  wheat  and  vegetable oils ana  fa~s -
whereby  subsidies will be  paid  to  the  producer  to  make 
up  to  him  the difference between  domestic  market prices 
and  prices set at production.  (First Chamber,  1965-66 
Session,  8300  (Second  Chamber)) 
2.  Firat Chamber  debates  added  value  taxation  system 
When  tae  Finance Minister's budget  (Section IX B  of the 
State budget for  1966)  came  before  the  Chamber,  Mr.  Van 
Campen  (Catholic People's Party)  drew  attention to  two 
draft directives,  on  harmonizing turnover tax,  of which 
the European Parliament had  been apprised.  The  need  for 
the Member  States  to work  together,  articulated in  the 
Treaty  of  Rome,  required  that  the  Dutch  too  should  envis-
age  adopting a  common  (added  value)  turnover taxation 
system,  a  principle  embodied  in  the first directive. Mr. 
Van  Campen  did not think this  should  raise any  difficulty. 
The  second  directive dealt with the  structure of  the  com-
mon  turnover  taxation system and  would  involve  a  cession 
of national independence  in respect of rates and  exemp-
tions. Mr.  Van  Campen  felt,  however,  that there was  a 
- 66  -limit beyond  which he  had  no  desire  to  go;  this limit, 
for him,  was  the introduction of a  national added  value 
tax and  was  conditional on  the retention, by  the national· 
parliaments of their independence in respect of taxes  and 
exemptions for a  provisional period. Until  the  powers  of 
the European Parliament were  extended,  this would  remain 
a  matter of necessity. 
The  EEC  Commission  had  stated in the  European Parliament 
1  that it hoped  all Member  States would  accept  the  two  dir-
ectives and  the  abolition of fiscal.frontiers. Mr.  Van 
1  Campen,  alluding to  this, asked if it were  symptomatic 
of a  change  in  the  Dutch Government's attitude. 
Mr.  Hoefnagels,  Secretary of State for Finance,  said in 
reply that the  Dutch  Government  had  never argued  tha~ 
frontiers  should  be left standing.  The  first requirement, 
however,  was  agreement  on  a  staggering number  of approxi-
mation measures in  the  most varied fields.  The  Secretary 
of State had  been unable  to  commit  himself about  the  two 
directives as yet for  the  same  reason as had  prompted Mr. 
Van  Campen  to  oppose  the  two  draft directives when  they 
came  before  the  European Parliament.  (Proceedings in the 
First Chamber,  29  March  1966,  1965-66  Session) 
3. Written questions 
The  Dutch contribution·to  the  elaboration of  the  medium-
term  economic  pol1cy 
In reply  to  a  question  from Mr.  Vredeling  (Labour Party) 
on  the  scope  of  the activities of  the  EEC  Committee  on 
the  medium-term  economic policy and  the  Dutch contribu-
tion  to its elaboration, Mr.  Cals,  Prime Minister and 
Minister for General  Affair~ stated  that the  draft pro-
gramme  for  the  medium-term  economic  policy which  the  EEC 
Commission was  called  upon  to  elaborate  on  the  basis of 
the work  done  by  the  Committee,  would  be  submitted  by  the 
Council  to  the  European Parliament  and  to  the  Economic 
and  Social Committee.  Mr.  Cals was  also  speaking for  the 
Minister for Economic  Affairs and  for  the Minister of 
Agriculture. 
"The  first task is to  throw as much  light as possible  on 
the main  factors in  the macro-economic  development  of  the 
Community  likely to  lend  themselves  to  the best possible 
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in the  years  ahead  - on  the basis of  the  macro-economic 
predictions worked  out by  a  group  of experts at the  EEC 
Commission." 
Mr.  Cals did not  expect that the _first programme  would, 
in its initial phase,  contain ·concrete  suggestions  on 
all aspects of policy.  In view  of the  completely novel 
nature  of  the  work,  the  complexity  of the matter  con-
cerned  and  the relatively short  time  at the disposal  of 
the  group  of experts in which  to  complete  their study, 
this would  probably be  incomplete  from  every point of 
view  and  would,  to  a  large  extent,  have  a  problematical 
character.  The  first preliminary draft would  not,  for 
example,  include  a  special chapter  on  agriculture.  The 
Netherlands was  participating in these activities in the 
following way.  The  "Centraal Planbureau"  (Central Plan-
ning Office) was  closely associated  in the  establishment 
of predictions.  The  Netherlands was  represented  on  the 
Committee  by  two  regular members  and  by  two  deputies 
who  followed  economic,  financial  and  social policy close-
ly. If necessary,  experts in the  fields of research, 
agriculture and  the  sciences,  etc., were  called  upon 
and  they  took part in  the work  through  working parties 
set up  by  the  Committee  and  in other ways. 
At  the  official level,  co-ordination was  effected  under 
the  authority of  the President of the  Dutch Delegation 
to  the  Committee.  The  finalization  of the Dutch point of 
view  on  the  medium-term  econonic  policy conceived  at the 
European level naturally fell  to  the  Council  of Mini-
sters."  (Second  Chamber,  1965-66  Session,  Annex  655) 
Consultation of  the  European Parliament  on  the  problem 
of f1napc1ng  the  common  agricultural policy 
Mr.  Luns.,  Foreign Minister,  who  was  also  speaking for 
Mr.  Biesheuvel,Minister for Agriculture  and  Fisheries, 
and  for Mr.  Vondeling,  Minister for Finance,  stated in 
reply  to  a  question  from Mr.  Vredeling  (Labour Party) 
that it was  not yet possible  to  say when  the  EEC  Com-
mission would  submit  amended  proposals  on  financing  the 
common  agricultural policy  on  the  basis of its memoran-
dum  of  22  July  1965.  In view  of  the political importance 
of this question,  those  concerned  were  ready  to  advocate 
"that the  Council  should  again  consult  the  opinion  of 
the  European Parliament  should  the  EEC  Commission  make 
substantial amendments  to its original proposals."  (Sec-
ond  Chamber,  1965-66  Session,  Annex  545) 
- 68  -Solution to  the  problem of butter surpluses 
In  re~ly to  a  guestion from.Mr.  Van  der Ploeg  (Labour 
Party), Mr.  Biesheuvel (Minister for Agriculture  and  Fish-
eries), who  was  also  speaking for Mr.  Den  Uyl  (Minister 
for Economic  Affairs) and  Mr.  Vondeling  (Finance Mini-
',  ster),  stated that he  was  opposed  to  granting official 
I  credits with a  view  to  increasing the fat  content of milk 
1  for drinking,  the  processing of butter fats into arti-
, ficial milk by replacing some  of  the milkless fats  and 
' the  sale of butter to  Community  industries at present 
engaged  in processing butter imported  from non-Member 
countries as part of  the processing traffic system. 
Although  the Minister felt  that in certain circumstances 
the  sale  of frozen butter at reduced  prices might  prove 
an effective way  of increasing butter sales,  he felt 
that this method  should never be  opted  for until all the 
other ways  of increasing butter sales had  been  exhausted. 
Mr.  Biesheuvelstated  that this view  was  shared  by  the  EEC 
Commission  and  by  most  of  the  Member  States.  There  were, 
however,  certain Member  States strongly  o~posed to  the 
sale  of frozen butter at reduced  prices.  (Second  Chamber, 
1965-66  Session,  Annex  549) 
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